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On Women, Equality and the Constitution: Through
the Looking Glass of Feminism
Ratna Kapur * and Brenda Cossman **
I

Introduction

Formal equality for women is explicitly enshrined within Indian law.
Notwithstanding formal guarantees of equality, Indian women's lives
continue to be characterised by pervasive discrimination and substantive
inequality. By examining the judicial interpretations of Indian
constitutional law, this paper will illustrate how the legal system itself
contributes to the gap between the formal guarantees of gender equality
and the substantive inequality that plagues women's lives. We will
argue that with some notable exceptions, the judicial approach to the
equality guarantees of the Constitution is informed by a problematic
approach to both equality, and gender difference.
The article begins by reviewing and evaluating two competing models
of equality - formal versus substantive equality. We will attempt to
briefly illustrate the extent to which Indian constitutional law is informed
by a formal model of equality, and how attempts at moving towards a
more substantive understanding have been thwarted by the deeply
embedded assumptions regarding equality as formal equality. The paper
will subsequently examine three competing approaches to the question
of the relevance of gender difference: protectionist, sameness, and
corrective. We then attempt to contextualise the Supreme Court and
High Court case law on gender discrimination within these debates.
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Formal versus Substantive Equality

The understanding of equality that has dominated Western thought
since the time of Aristotle has been one of fonnal equality. Equality has
been interpreted as "treating likes alike", its constitutional expression in
American and subsequently Indian equal protection doctrine, as the
requirement that "those [who are] similarly situated be treated similarly". 1
Within this prevailing conception, equality is equated with sameness.
Indeed, sameness is the entitling criteria for equality. Only if you are the
same are you entitled to be treated equally. Further, within this equal
treatment approach any difference in treatment as between similarly
situated individuals, constitutes discrimination.2 In other words, if you
are the same, then you should not be treated differently.
The similarly situated test requires that the Court begin by defining
the relevant groups or classes for comparison. In contrast a substantive
model of equality begins with the recognition that equality sometimes
requires that individuals be treated differently. This approach is extremely
critical of the fonnal model of equality, and its emphasis is on sameness.
Martha Minow, in exploring the problematic connection between equality
and sameness has observed:
The problem with this concept of equality is that it makes the
recognition of difference a threat to the premise behind equality.
If to be equal you must be the same, then to be different is to be
unequal. 3
This initial definitional step can effectively preclude any further
equality analysis. If the Court defines the classes as different, then no

1

2

3

Tussman, Joseph and Tenbroek, Jacobus "The Equal Protection of the Laws" 37
CAllF. L. REV. 341 (1949); see also Haragopal Reddy, "Equality Doctrine and the
Indian Constitution" 45 ANDHRA LAW TIMES 57,58 (1982) ["All persons are to
be treated alike. except where circumstances require different treatment"].
As Parmanand Singh notes in Singh, "Equal Opportunity and Compensatory
Discrimination: Constitutional Policy and Judicial Control" 18:2 JOURNAL OF
THE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE 300, 301 (1976) ••..legal equality requires the
absence of any discrimination in the words of the law"; see also, K.C. DWIREDI,
RIGHT TO EQUALITY AND THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1990), who dermes
equality as signifying ••that among equals law should be equal and equally
administered".
Martha Minow, "Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual
and Special Education" 48 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 157,207
(1985).
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further analysis is required; difference justifies the differential treatment.4
Accordingly, when groups are not similarly situated, then they do not
qualify for equality, even if the differences among them are the product
of historic or systemic discrimination.S
The focus of a substantive equality approach is not simply on equal
treatment under the law, but rather on the actual impact of the law.6 The
explicit objective of a model of substantive equality is the elimination of
the substantive inequality of disadvantaged groups in society. As
Parmanand Singh notes, it "takes into account inequalities of social,
economic and educational background of the people and seeks the
elimination of existing inequalities by positive measures".7 The focus of
the analysis is not with sameness or difference, but rather with
disadvantage. Substantive equality is directed at eliminating individual,
institutional and systemic discrimination against disadvantaged groups
which effectively undermines their full and equal social, economic,

4

S

6

7

BRODSKY AND DAY, CANADIAN CHARTER OF EQUAUTY RIGHTS FOR
WOMEN: ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK, 153 (1989) [''The way the
make the difference between winning and losing. The Court can justify making a
comparison between classes or refusing to make a comparison by the way they
derme the class, or whether they recognize it at all."] See also at 155, ["Just as the
way the Court dermes a class can determine the outcome, so can the way the Court
compares or fails to compare the classes it has identified. Sometimes the courts
simply fail to make a comparison; and sometimes comparisons are tautological
because the courts compare classes only within the terms already set out in the
law."]
The problems with the formal approaCh to equality, and with the similarly situated
test have been widely recognised and criticised. For example, the Supreme Court of
Canada in Andrews v. the Law Society of Upper Canada [1989] 1 S.C.R. 43, held:
["The test as stated is seriously deficient in that it excludes any consideration of the
nature of the law. If it were to be applied literally, it could be used to justify the
Nuremburg laws of Adolf Hitler.
Similar treatment was contemplated for all
Jews."] In A. Laxamana MMhy v. State of AP., A 1980 A.P. 293, 298 the High
Court similarly observed: ["Hitler's classification of all Jews into a separate category
for the purposes of butchering them and N axalites classification of all landlords into
a separate category for purposes of extenninating them cannot therefore be faulted
on this theory of equal protection clause"].
As Maureen Maloney has written in Maloney, "An Analysis of Direct Taxes -in
India: A Feminist Perspective" 30:4 JOURNAL OF lliE INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE
397 (1988) ["Such inequality results from provisions which though seemingly
neutral in their application (and therefore conforming to notions of formal equality)
in reality result in discrimination. Certain provisions have the effect of discriminating
between men and women because in practice they only affect women].
Singh, supra note 2, at 301. He describes this approach as one of equality in fact, or
compensatory discrimination.
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political and cultural participation in society. 8 The central inquiry of this
approach is whether the rule or practice in question contributes to the
subordination of the disadvantaged group. Accordingly, discrimination
consists of treatment that disadvantages or further oppresses a group that
has historically experienced institutional and systemic oppression.
The shift in focus from sameness and difference to disadvantage
significantly broadens the equality analysis .. Within a formal equality
model, the difference between, for example, able bodied and less able
bodied persons could preclude an equality challenge. According to this
model, because disabled persons are different, they do not have to be
treated equally. Within a substantive equality model, however, the focus
is not on whether disabled persons are different, but rather, on whether
their treatment in law contributes to their historic disadvantage. Indeed,
differences are not seen to preclude an entitlement to equality, but rather,
are embraced within the concept of equality. Within this model of
equality, differential treatment may be required "not to perpetuate the
existing inequalities, but to achieve and maintain a real state of effective
equality."9 As such, the failure of a rule or practice to take into account
the particular needs of disabled persons, and thus perpetuate the historic
disadvantage of this group, would constitute discrimination, and violate
their equality rights.

m

Judicial Approaches to Equality Rights in India

The following section will briefly review the judicial approaches to
the equality rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Indian
Constitution.
It will attempt to illustrate the extent to which the
constitutional doctrine is informed by a fonnal model of equality, in
which equality is equated with sameness. While some inroads have been
made towards a substantive model of equality in recent case law, the
I

Kathy Lahey, "Feminist Theories of (In) Equality", in EQUAUTY AND JUDICIAL
NEUTRAUTY
71 (S. Martin and K. Mahoney eds. 1987) argues that courts must
adopt an approach which considers the effect of the rule or practice being challenged,
to determine whether it contributes to the actual inequality of women, and whether
changing the rule will actually produce an improvement in the specific material
conditions of the women affected. See also Colleen Sheppard, "Equality, Ideology
and Oppression: Women and the Canadian Charter" in CHARTER WATCH:
REFLECTIONS ON EQUALITY (1986) who argues that the central question to be
asked is whether the rule or practice in question contributes to the social inequality
of women.

,

Raj Kumar Gupta. "Justice:
Unequal but Inseparate"
INDIAN LAW INSTITUTE 57, 76 (1969).

11 JOURNAL
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continuing hold of the fonnal model of equality over the judiciary's
approach has operated to profoundly limit even these more progressive
approaches to the equality guarantees.
A. Article 14
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before the law and
equal protection under the law. It has been interpreted as a prohibition
against unreasonable classification.
The equality guarantee does not
require that the law treat all individuals exactly the same. Rather, it
allows the State to make classifications.
However, this power of
classification must be exercised on reasonable grounds. to The Supreme
Court has expressly adopted a similarly situated approach to equality
rights under Article 14. 11 Accordingly, the first step in detennining
whether Article 14 has been violated is a consideration of whether the
persons between whom discrimination is alleged fall within the same
class. If the persons are not deemed to be similarly circumstanced, then
no further consideration is required.
The principles adopted by the CQurt are premised on a fonnal model
of equality. The focus of the analysis is on the question of sameness - on
detennining whether the persons among whom the denial of equality is
alleged are the same, or whether the classification is based on reasonable
differences. In this approach, there is no interrogation of substantive
inequalities - of such social and economic disadvantages that may have
10

11

Article 14 provides: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law
or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. The Supreme Court
has held that two conditions must be met to pass this test of reasonable classification:
["(i)...the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentiation which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the
group (ii)...that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute in question"]: Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, A 1955
S.C. 191; State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali, (1952) S.C.R 340; R.K. Dalmia v Justice
S.R. Tendolkar, A 1958 S.C. 538. See also H.M SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF INDIA 292-293 (3rd ed. 1988); D.D.BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF INDIA 32 (10th ed. 1988).
["The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of
law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the
remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of
circumstances. It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws
would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no
discrimination between one person and another, if as regards the subject matter of
the legislation, their position is substantially the same'1 in DaImia, id. at 539. See
also U.P. Electric Co. v. State of U.P., A 1970 S.C. 21.
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produced differences between persons. 12
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasised a "new dimension"
of Article 14, namely "that it embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness". 13
While the new doctrine has been harshly criticised as a significant shift
away from the reasonable classification approach by some commentators, 14
there has been little if any significant change in the underlying
understanding of equality. The new judicial reasoning has incorporated
the doctrine of classification into its folds and thus continues to be
premised on a formal model of equality. IS
B.

Article 15

Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the ground of religion, race,
caste, sex, and place of birth. In reviewing the judicial interpretation of
Article 15, we will attempt to identify some of the doctrinal techniques
used by the Courts and locate these techniques within the broader context
of the competing models of equality.
(i)

Discrimination

A number of debates have arisen in the case law regarding the meaning
of discrimination within Article 15. 16 At a general level, this concerns
12

13

14

15

16

See, for example BASU. supra note 10, at 32 who writes ["When a law is challenged
as denying equal protection, the question for determination by the Court is not
whether it has resulted in inequality, but whether there is some difference which
bears a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation"]. B asu' s description
of reasonable classification under Article 14 is explicitly based on the equation of
equality and sameness.
Ajay Rasia v. Khalid Mujib, A 1981 S.C. 487, 499; E.P. Royapappa v. State of
Tamil Nadu, A 1974 S.C. 555, 583; Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. LA.A.!, A 1979
S.C. 1628, 1643. See also Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, A 1978 S.C. 597, 624
where the. Court held: ["Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and
dimensions
and it cannot be imprisoned
within traditional
and doctrinaire
limits ...Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment"].
SEERY AI, supra note 10, at 272-279, para 16.
["The doctrine of classification ...is ... a judicial formula for determining whether
the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting
a denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable ...the impugned legislative
or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under
Article 14 would be breached."] : Seervai, supra note 10 at 408.
Article 15 provides: (1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion,
race, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth -+
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the context of the judicial interpretations of the treatment authorised by
Article 15(3). TIlls article, which allows the State to make special
provisions for women, has been interpreted as authorising the State to
discriminate in favour of women. However, a further question is whether
article 15(3) authorises discrimination against women. In Mahadeb Jiew
v. RB. Sen,17 the Calcutta High Court held that Article 15(3) could not
be used to authorise discrimination agaiQst women but rather, from the
language used in the Article, it was clear that the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to protect the interests of women and
children. 18 Article 15(3) has thus been limited to upholding legislation
that benefits women; not extended to authorising discrimination against
women. TIlls interpretation is useful, as far as it goes. At the level of
application, when the Courts must interpret whether legislation benefits
or discriminates against women, the doctrine provides little guidance.
The absence of a substantive approach to equality that attempts to
contextualise the legal regulation of women within gender oppression
allows the courts to classify laws as "protection". There is little
consideration of whether the laws actually benefit women or of the
appropriateness of the underlying rationale for the ostensibly protectionist
legislation. 19
TIlls question of the treatment authorised by Article 15(3) is related
to a deeper question of the meaning of discrimination within Article 15

-7 or any of them, be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition
with regard to (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of State furids or dedicated to the use of the general public.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision
for women and children.

17

18

19

(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of article 29 shall prevent the State from
making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally
backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.
A 1951 Cal. 563.
According to the Court, Article 15(3) did not use the language "discriminate against"
but rather use "special provisions for". In Dattatraya Motiram More v. State of
Bombay, A 1953 Bom. 311, at para 7, the Court held that the effect of the joint
operation of Article 15(1) and 15(3) was that the State could discriminate in favour
of women against men, but could net discriminate in favour of men against women.
See also Shahdad v. Mohd Abdullah, A 1967 1.& K. 120, Mt. Choki v. State, A
1957 Raj. 10. SEERV AI, supra note 10, at 410, is in agreement with this approach,
noting at 410 that [••... it effectuates both the general policy underlying Art. 15(1)
and the necessity of making an exception in favour of women and children, whose
position requires special protection"].
This approach was also followed in Anjall Roy v. State, A'1952 Cal. 825.

8
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more generally. Two approaches to the meaning of discrimination can
be identified in the case law. In the first approach, discrimination means
any classification or distinction on the prohibited grounds. It is based on
a formal understanding of equality as sameness, and thus, of discrimination
as any distinction as between similar individuals on the prohibited grounds.
This formal approach to discrimination is evident in the court's use of
the terms "preferential" or "compensatory" discrimination. The courts
speak of discrimination in favour of women - a term that only makes
sense if discrimination is taken to mean any classification or distinction.20
In the second approach, discrimination means an adverse distinction
on the prohibited grounds, that is, distinctions that disadvantage. It is
based on a more substantive understanding of equality, concerned not
simply with treatment that differentiates, but rather, with treatment that
disadvantages. This approach to discrimination was suggested in Anjali
Roy, wherein the Court held:
All differentiation
is not discrimination
but only such
differentiation as is invidious and as is made, not because any
real difference in the conditions or natural differences between
the persons dealt with which makes different treatment necessary,
but because of the presence of some characteristics or affiliation
which is either disliked or not regarded with equal favour but
which has no rational connection with the differentiations made
as a justifying reason.21
The Court's approach goes some way toward substantive equality, in
so far as it directs attention to whether the distinctions drawn by the
legislation are invidious. However, this shift is limited by the Court's
understanding of difference as effectively precluding equality. Within
this framework of formal equality, invidious distinctions would only be
those distinctions not based on real differences. The Court's approach
thereby remains overly influenced by a formal model of equality.22

20

21

22-

In Dattatraya, supra note 18 at 314 para 7, for example, the Court states: ["The
proper way to construe Article 15(3)...is that ... discrimination in favour of women
is permissible, and when· the State does discriminate in favour of women, it does
not offend against Article 15(1)"].
Supra note 19, at para 16. This substantive approach to discrimination was also
hinted at in Kathi Ranning Rawal v. Saurashtra, A 1952 S.C. 123, 125 wherein
Sastri, CJ stated: ["Discrimination thus involves an element of unfavourable bias
and it is in that sense that the expression has to be understood in this ~Qntext."]
There is no symmetry between the formal approaches to discrimination and to the
relationship between the articles discussed in the following section; nor between
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Relationship between Articles

J 5(1)

and

9

J 5(3)

A major issue that has arisen with regard to Article 15 is the
relationship of clauses (1) and (2) with clauses (3) and (4). Two
approaches to this relationship have emerged in judicial decision-making.
We will refer to them as the "exception approach" and the "holistic
approach". In the first approach, Articles 15(3) and 15(4) are interpreted
as exceptions to the general equality guarantees. A classic statement of
this "exception approach" is found in Anjali Roy v. State of W.E., in
which the Calcutta High Court held that Article 15(3):
.., is obviously an exception to clause (1) and (2) and since its
effect is to authorise what the Article otherwise forbids, its
meaning seems to be that notwithstanding that clause (1) and (2)
forbid discrimination against any citizen on the grounds of sex,
the State may discriminate against males by making a special
provision in favour of females.23
The "exception approach" has been overwhelmingly supported by
the commentators.24 In the second approach, Article 15 is seen as a
whole, and therefore Article 15(3) and 15(4) are used to interpret the
equality provisions more generally. This "holistic approach" was endorsed

23
24

the more substantive approaches to discrimination and to the relationship between
the articles. The difference between these understandings of discrimination and of
the relationship between the articles remain unarticulated, and the relationship to
the broader models of equality is obscured in both the case law and the commentaries.
For example, in Dattatraya supra note 18, the Court adopted the formal approach to
discrimination, yet was also shown to have adopted the more substantive approach
to the relationship between the Articles. Conversely, in Anjali Roy, supra note 19
the Court adopted a more substantive approach to discrimination, but the formal
approach to the relationship between the Articles. This apparent inconsistency is
also evident in the commentaries.
Supra note 19 at 830-831.
SEERVAI, supra note 10, at 396 for example, argues that Articles 15(3) and 15(4)
must be seen as exceptions to the general guarantees of equality. ["Article 15(1)
prohibits discrimination only on the ground of sex; therefore a discrimination in
favour of women would necessarily discriminate against men only on the ground of
sex and would be void. The discretionary pOwerin Art. 15(3) relaxes this prohibition
in favour of women by expressly authorising such discrimination by way of an
exception"]. See also SEERVAI, SUPPLEMENT TO THE THIRD EDmON, (1988)
241. JAIN and BASU both argue that Articles 15(3) and 15(4) are exceptions to
Articles 15(1) and (2). BASU, supra note 10, at 67, who argues for example:
["Being an exception, clause (4) cannot be so extended as in effect to destroy the
guarantee in cl(I) ...••]. See also JAIN, M.P. INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
430 (3rd ed. 1978).

10
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in Dattatraya, wherein the Bombay High Court held:
...Article 15(3) is obviously a proviso to Article 15(1) and proper
effect must be given to that proviso ... The proper way to construe
Article 15(3) in our opinion is that whereas under Article 15(1)
discrimination in favour of men only on the ground of sex is not
permissible, by reason of Article 15(3) discrimination in favour
of women is pennissible, and when the State does discriminate·
in favour of women, it does not offend against Article 15(1).25
The "holistic approach" appears to have been given more general
expression by several High Courts, and the Supreme Court.26
These two competing approaches to the relationship between the
clauses of Article 15 roughly correspond to the two competing models of
equality. In the first, "exception approach" equality is equated with
sameness. Any deviation from identical treatment as contemplated by
Article 15(3) and 15(4) must then be considered an exception to equality.
In the second, "holistic approach", equality is understood as sometimes
requiring that individuals be treated differently. Therefore, the special
treatment contemplated by Article 15(3) and 15(4) need not be seen as
an exception, but as a fundamental part of equality.27 This approach

25

26

21

Dattatraya, supra note 18, at 314. See also Ram Chandra Mahton v.State of Bihar,
A 1966 Pat. 214. BASU, supra note 10 at 68 is extremely critical of this approach.
With regard to the decision in Dattatraya he writes: [••...such discrimination in
favour of women would be justifiable only if clause (3) could be regarded as a
complete exception to clause (1) of Article 15. The use of the word "women" in
juxtaposition to children in (3)(d) suggests that the special provision referred to in
it must be related to such disabilities which are peculiar to women and children"].
An early indication of the Supreme Court's preference for it is evident in Abdul
Aziz v. Bombay, A 1954 S.C. 321. In rejecting the argument that Article 15(3)
should be restricted to provisions that benefit women, the Court stated that ••Article
14 is general and must be read with the other provisions which set out the ambit of
fundamental rights." More recently, the Supreme Court has held that Articles 14,
15 and 16 constitute a single code. See Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 1 S.C.R.
906; Shamsher Singh v. State, A 1970 P.& H. 372.
Such an approach has been advocated by Marc Galanter, in relation to the provisions
of both Article 15 and 16: ["Article 15(4) and 16(4) are undoubtedly exceptions to
the constitutional prohibition of State employment of the otherwise forbidden criteria
of caste, religion and so forth. But it does not follow that they are exceptions to the
policy of equal treatment mandated by Articles 14, 15 and 16. In respect to the
general policy of equality they represent an empowerment of the State to pursue
substantive equality in respect to the disparities between the backward classes and
others"]. Marc Galanter, "Symbolic Activism: A Judicial Encounter with the Contours
of India's Compensatory Discrimination Policy", LAW AND SOCIETY IN MODERN
INDIA, 112 (1989).
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goes some way toward a substantive model, in so far as difference need
not preclude equality, but rather, is embraced within it. This approach,
however, stops considerably short of recognizing equality as essentially
a question of disadvantage. The shift toward substantive equality is
further limited by the extent to which the Court remains overly influenced
by a formal model of equality. For example, while the Court in Dattatraya
adopted this more substantive understanding of the relationship between
the articles, it also adopted an approach to discrimination based on a
formal model of equality.28
(iii)

On the Grounds Only of Sex'

Article 15(1) prohibits -discrimination "...on the grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them." It has been
interpreted as requiring discrimination "only" on the prohibited grounds.
As the Court noted in Anjali Roy v. State of W.B.:
[T]he discrimination which is forbidden is only such
discrimination as is based solely on the ground that a person
belongs to a particular race or caste or professes a particular
religion or was born at a particular place or is of a particular sex
and on no other ground. A discrimination based on one or more
of these grounds and also on other grounds is not hit by the
Article.29
According to this interpretation, if discrimination is found to exist on
grounds other than those enumerated, then there is no violation of Article
15(1). Even discrimination on the basis of sex, coupled with
discrimination on other non-enumerated grounds, would not constitute a

21

29

For example, SEERV AI, supra note 10, at 404, an advocate of the formal equality
approach to the relationship between the Articles, adopts a more substantive definition
of discrimination.
He notes that the defmition of discrimination in the Oxford
dictionary is "to make an adverse distinction with regard to; to distinguish unfavorably
from others". This apparent inconsistency, however, in Seervai's analysis is remc;died,
in so far as, in his view any preferential treatment of one group can be seen as
adverse treatment of another group. Thus, virtually any distinction can be understood
as adverse distinction. His concept of discrimination can thereby be seen as premised
on a formal model of equality in which equality is equated with sameness, and
discrimination with any difference in treatment as between those who are the same.
Supra note 19, at 829 para 16. See also Purnananda Banerjee v. Swapna Banerjee, A
1981 Ca!. 123; Shahdad v. Mohd Abdullah, supra note 18.

12
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violation.3O

The focus on "the grounds only of sex" has been used primarily to
uphold legislation that provides preferential treatment for women. In
attempting to uphold this legislation the courts have searched for some
other ground on which the legislative distinction is based. In their search,
the Courts have caste their net widely. They have found, for example,
that distinctions based also on the "backward" social position of women,
on the financial need of wives for support, and on public morality
constitute grounds other than those stated in Article 15(1).31 This process
by which the courts are attempting to uphold legislation that gives
preferential treatment to women is somewhat misdirected.
Both the
backward social position of women, and the financial need of wives for
support are products of the social, economic and political inequality of
women. Legislation designed to promote women's position and/or provide
for the financial needs of economically dependent women should not be
seen as discrimination against women. But the reason is not because
these distinctions are broader than the ground of sex. Rather, it is
precisely because these provisions are based on ameliorating the conditions
that women have suffered on the ground of sex. Sex is a category which
has traditionally denoted disadvantage - it has been used as a ground for
discrimination and has resulted in women being "more backward" than
men. Yet, the Court attempts to distinguish the ground of sex from other
factors, rather than seeing the fundamental relationship between them.
The intention of the Courts in their inquiry into "on the ground only
of sex" is laudable. They can in some respects be seen to be pursuing a
more substantive vision of equality - that is - one which is concerned
with promoting the social, economic and political equality of women. As
30

31

The Court in Dattatraya, supra note 18, at 313 para 7, similarly held: ["It must
always be borne in mind that the discrimination which is not permissible under
Article 15(1) is a discrimination which is only on one of the grounds mentioned in
Article 15(1). If there is a discrimination in favour of a particular sex, that
discrimination would be permissible provided it is not only on the ground of sex, or
in other words, the classification on the ground of sex is permissible provided that
classification is the result of other considerations besides the fact that the persons
belonging to that class are of a particular sex"].
In Girdhar Gopal v. State of M.B., A 1953 MB. 147, the Court adopted this
approach to uphold the constitutionality of section 354 of the Indian Penal Code the offence of outraging the modesty of women. The Court held at para 5 ["If the
discrimination is based not merely on any of the grounds stated in Art. 15(1) but
also on considerations of property, pul?lic morals, decency, decorum and rectitude,
the legislation containing such discrimination would not be hit by the provisions of
Art. 15(1). It cannot be denied that an assault or criminal force to a woman with
intent to outrage her modesty is made punishable under s. 354 not merely because
women are women, but because of the factors enumerated ..."].
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such, the courts do not strike down legislation designed to benefit women
by calling it discrimination on the basis of sex. However, their focus on
the technical meaning of "only on the ground of sex" obscures this
normative vision of equality. Indeed, the construction of this issue as a
narrow and mechanical question of interpretation is motivated by the
prevailing understanding of equality as formal equality. The deeply
rooted belief that any special treatment constitutes an exception to equality
leads the Court to attempt to avoid the issue (Article 15 (3)
notwithstanding) by constructing the discrimination as not only on the
basis of sex. Moreover, this narrow focus on "the grounds only" of sex
is potentially dangerous.
Without an inquiry into disadvantage and
substantive inequalities, a search for other grounds could even be used to
uphold legislation that disadvantages women. For example, legislation
prohibiting women from voting could be found to be based not only on
sex, but also on the "backward social position" of women.
The Delhi High Court, in Walter Alfred Baid v. Union of India,32
although dealing primarily with a challenge under Article 16(2), recognised
some of the problems implicit in this approach to "only on the grounds
of sex". The Court observed:
...it is difficult to accept the position that a discrimination based
on sex is nevertheless not a discrimination based on sex "alone"
because it is based on "other considerations" even though these
other considerations have their genesis in the sex itself. It virtually
amounts to saying that woman was being discriminated
against...not because she belonged to a particular sex but because
of what the sex implied .... 33
The Court concluded:
Sex and what it implies can not be severed. Considerations
which have their genesis in sex and arise out of it would not save
such a discrimination. What could save such a discrimination is
any ground or reason independently of sex such as socio-economic
conditions, marital status, and other disqualifying conditions such
as age, background, health, academic accomplishments, etc. 34
The approach in W.A. Baid recognised the connection between sex
32

.33
34

A 1976 Del. 302 .
Id. at 306 para 10.
Id. at 308 para 10.
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and the social implications of sex, and thus criticised the narrow doctrinal
approach to "only on the ground of sex". However, the approach is not
unproblematic. The decision is rooted firmly within a formal model of
equality, and the result of the case was to strike down a recruitment rule
that had been advantageous for women.
While the debates within the Article 15 case law reveal a tension
between a formal and substantive vision of equality, these underlying
normative differences remain unarticulated, and the case law remains
overly determined by a formal model of equality. Rather than weaving
the various substantive equality threads together, the threads are left to
unravel.
C.

Article 16

A similar tension between formal and substantive equality is apparent
in Article 16, which guarantees equality of opportunity and prohibits
discrimination in matters of employment.3s A formal interpretation of
equality of opportunity pervaded the early case law. For example, in All
India S.M. and A.S.M.'s Assn. v. Gen. Manager Central Railway, the
Supreme Court held that equality of opportunity in matters of promotion
guaranteed by Article 16(1) must be interpreted to mean equality among
members of the same class of employees, and not equality among members
of different classes.36 The similarly situated test, with its emphasis on
sameness as the basic entitlement to equality, thus infused the court's
" Article 16 provides:(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to
employment or appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of
birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect
of any employment or office under lite State.
(3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing,
in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the
Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory,
any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such
employment or appointment.
(4) nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the
reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens
which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services
under the State.
(5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that
the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or
denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a
person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination.
:M A 1960 S.C. 384, followed in Govind Dattatray v. Controller of Imports and
Exports, A 1967 S.C. 839.
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understanding of equality of opportunity and reinforced the fonnal model
of equality Y
Notwithstanding this fonnal equality approach, a tension has emerged
within the court's approach to equality of opportunity. For example, a
similar controversy has arisen over the appropriate relationship between
the clauses of article 16. Within the fonnal approach to equality of
opportunity, the special provisions authonsed by 16(4) for "backward
classes" are seen as exceptions to the general equality of opportunity
guarantees under Articles 16(1) and 16(2). The commentators again
advocate the fonnal approach.38 Within the second, more substantive
approach to equality of opportunity, the special provisions are seen to be
used in interpreting the general guarantees.39 This approach has been
adopted in the case law. Some High Courts have gone so far as to say
that Articles 14, 15 and 16 constitute a single code.40

37

38

39

411

It should be emphasised that the critique is directed at the judicial approach to
equality, and not necessarily at the particular outcome of the cases. The AIl India
SM and ASM's Assn case could have been decided by reference to a more substantive
understanding of equality, and equality of opportunity. The differential treatment in
the case, namely that between road-side station masters and guards, was not
discrimination, that is, it was not treatment based on personal or group characteristics
and/or historical disadvantage. The ruling of the Supreme Court can be supported,
without endorsing the particular model of equality that informed the Court's
reasoning.
BASU, supra note 10, at 71 argues for example ["Clause (1) and (2) of this Article
guarantee equality of opportunity to all citizens in the matter of appointment to any
office or of any other employment, under the State. Clauses (3) - (5), however, lay
down several exceptions to ·the above rule of equal opportunity"].
Marc Galanter has described the·formal approach to equality of opportunity as one
in which: ["Equality is visualised as identical opportunities to compete for existing
values among those differently endowed, regardless of structural determinants of
the chances of success or of the consequences for the distribution of values"].
Galanter, supra note 27 at 262. Within this view, preferential treatment, or
"compensatory discrimination" is seen as an exception to equality; it "is accepted as
a marginal adjustment to be made where the results of complete equality are
unacceptable". He contrasts this approach with a second, more substantive approach
to equality, in which [••...the present is seen as a 'transition' from past inequality to
a desired future of substantive equality; the purposes of compensatory discrimination
is to promote equalization by offsetting historically accumulated inequalities. Thus
compensatory discrimination does not detract from equality in the interests of
present fairness; rather, it is seen as a requisite to the fulfilment of the nation's long
run goal of substantive redistribution and equalization"] Id. at 263.
See Shamsher Singh Hukam Singh v. Punjab, A 1970 P.& H. 372. For example, in
Shamsher Singh, the Court held: "Article 14, 15 and 16, being the constituents of a
single code of COnstitlltionalguarantees, supplementing each other, clause (3) of
Article 15 can be invoked for construing and determining the scope of Article
16(2)."
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The Supreme Court has addressed this debate. In Kerala v. N.M.
Thomas,41 the Supreme Court held that Article 16(4) was not an exception
to Article 16(1), and further held that Articles 15 and 16 are facets of
Article 14. Indeed, in Thomas, the Supreme Court began to articulate a
substantive model of equality.42 The clearest statement of this doctrinal
shift is found in the judgment of Mathew, J. which explicitly rejects the
formal model of equality.43 and argues that equality of opportunity will
require more than equality in law or formal equality.44
Though complete identity [sic] of equality of opportunity is
impossible in this world, measures compensatory in character
and which are calculated to mitigate surmountable obstacles to
ensure equality of opportunity can never incur the wrath of Article
16(1).45

In Thomas, the Supreme Court began to articulate a substantive
model of equality. While some Courts have recognised the doctrinal
shift in Thomas 46,other courts and commentators have argued strenuously

41
42

43

44

45

46

A 1976 S.C. 490.
For a detailed discussion of the doctrinal shift in Thomas, see Galanter, supra note
27, at 265-278.
Justice Mathews argues that formal equality is achieved by treating all persons
equally: ["Each man to count for one and no one to count for more than one. But
men are not equal in all respects .... We, therefore have to resort to some sort of
proportionate equality in many spheres to achieve justice"] Thomas, supra note 41,
at 513 para 78. He continues: ["The principle of proportional equality is attained
only when equals are treated equally and unequals unequally. This would raise the
baffling question: Equals and unequals in what?"] Mathew, J. notes the formal
approach to equality requires criteria by which differences, and thus differential
treatment can be justified, and o~erves that "[t]he real difficulty arises in fmding
out what constitutes a relevant difference." Id. at 513 para 79.
["Equality of opportunity is not simply a matter of legal equality. Its existence
depends not merely on the absence of disabilities, but on the existence of abilities."]
who
Id. at 515 para 90. A similar shift is evident in Krishna Iyer J.'s decision,
refers, for example, to the need to bring the weaker sections of society ["to a real,
not formal equality'1. Id. at 529 para 142 He concludes: [" ...that the genius of
Articles 14 to 16 consist not in literal equality but in progressive elimination of
pronounced inequality.'1 Id. at 537 para 167.
Id. at 514 para 82. At 515"para 89, he writes " ...if we want to give equality of
opportunity for employment to the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, we will have to take note of their social educational and economic
environment. "
See lagdish Rai v. State of Haryana, A 1977 P.& H. 56, 61, in which the Thomas
c!l5e is interpreted as having "introduced a new dynamic and a new dimension. into
the concept of ... equality of oppornmity"; See Singh, supra note 2, at 304-319; and
see generally Galanter, supra note 27.
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against it.47 Not surprisingly, the Thomas case has been most severely
critised by those commentators who remain firmly committed to equ~ty
as formal equality. Their criticisms, however, are rarely articulated in
such terms, but rather, remain focussed on the narrow, doctrinal aspects
of the case. Indeed, the failure of the Court to go far enough in articulating
its substantive model of equality can be seen to have contributed to this
critical reaction.48
The Supreme Court has continued to approach Article 16 in a manner
that is critical of formal equality, and appears to be more informed by a
substantive approach. In Roop Chand Adlakha and others v. Delhi
Development Authority49, the Court was critical of the doctrine of
classification within formal equality, observing that the process of
classification could obscure the question of inequality. 50 More recently,
in Marti Chandra Skekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S.MY, the Supreme
Court recognized that disadvantaged persons may have to be treated

47
48

•9
50

51

SEERVAI, supra note 10, at 428-441.
Both the doctrinal techniques and the discourses used by the Supreme Court have
restricted the transformative potential of the case. For example, the Court adopted
"the theory of legislative device". The Court cites with approval the passage from
Devadasan's case. ["The expression "nothing in this article" is a legislative device
to express its intention in a most emphatic way that the power conferred thereunder
is not limited in any way by the main provision but falls outside it. It has not really
carved out an exception, but has preserved a power untrammelled by the other
provisions of the article"]. While this theory of legislative device can be seen to
support the view that Article 15 and 16 must be broadly construed, the reasoning of
the Supreme Court has remained predominantly at the level of technical doctrine.
The court has not gone far enough in articulating its substantive theory of equality
that ought to inform this doctrine. Opponents of this approach remain free to engage
exclusively at the level of technical interpretation from the unstated vantage point
of formal equality. Seervai and Basu continue to chip away at the reasoning without
having to confront the fundamental differences in their normative vision of equality
informing the Constitution. Similarly, the Court continues to invoke the term
"compensatory discrimination". Discrimination thus continues to mean any
distinction, rather than distinctions that disadvantage within the broader understanding
of substantive equality .
A 1989 S.C. 307.
Id. at 312 ["The over emphasis on the doctrine of classification or any anxious and
sustained attempts to discover some basis for classification may gradually and
imperceptibly deprive the article of its previous content and end in replacing the
doctrine of equality by the doctrine of classification ...The idea of similarity or
dissimilarity of situations of persons, to justify classification cannot rest on merely
differentia which may, by themselves by rational or logical, but depends on whether
the differences are relevant to the goals to be reached by the law which seeks to
classify"] .
1990 3 S.C.C. 130.
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differently in order to be treated equally:
Those who are unequal, in fact, cannot be treated by identical
standards; that may be equality in law but it would certainly not
be real equality ...The State must, therefore, resort to compensatory
State action for the purpose of making people who are formally
unequal in their wealth, education or social environment, equal
in specified areas. S2
Notwithstanding the critics of this substantive approach, it is important
to recognize that the choice between formal and substantive equality is
not simply a choice of the correct interpretative techniques. It is a
normative choice of the appropriate model of equality informing the
constitutional guarantees. Any attempt at framing the issue as exclusively
one of mechanical techniques simply masks these difficult normative
choices facing the judiciary.
It is, moreover, a normative choice between questions of sameness
and difference, or questions of disadvantage. Instead of comparing the
relative sameness and/or difference, a shift to a substantive model of
equality would require the Court's commitment to explore the question
of disadvantage in equality challenges, that is, to interrogate whether the
differential treatment reinforces the inequality of historically and
systemically disadvantaged groups.
V Judicial Approaches to Sex Discrimination
A.

Introduction: The Relevance of Gender

The case law dealing with sex discrimination reflects the more general
judicial approaches to the interpretation of equality rights. The same
tension between formal and substantive equality is apparent, a tension
which remains largely unarticulated
in the case law.
The sex
discrimination case law remains overly determined by a formal model of
equality. While some inroads to a substantive model of equality are
evident, the judicial approaches remain limited by their formal equality
discourse. But the case law dealing with sex discrimination raises some
issues of its own. The prevailing conception of equality as sameness has
led to a focus on the relevance of gender difference. Three approaches
are apparent: protectionist, sameness and corrective.
The following
discussion will first briefly review and evaluate these three approaches to
j2

Id. at 138.
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gender difference. It will attempt to reveal the extent to which these
judicial approaches are overwhelmingly informed not only by a formal
approach to equality, but moreover, by a deeply problematic approach to
gender difference.
The first, and most common approach is a protectionist approach in
which women are constructed as weak and subordinate, and are thus in
need of protection.
In this approach, the Court's understanding of
women's differences is asserted as justification for differential treatment.
While in some circumstances this differential treatment is preferential
treatment, more often than not the differences are seen as sufficient
justification in and of themselves for differential treatment. lbis approach
tends to essentialise difference - that is to say - to take the existence of
difference as the natural and inevitable point of departure. There is
virtually no interrogation of the basis of the difference, nor any substantive
consideration of the impact of the differential treatment on women.
Rather, women's differences are seen to justify differential treatment,
and any differential treatment is virtually deemed to be preferential
treatment. In the name of protecting women, this approach often serves
to reinforce their subordinate status.
The second approach is an equal treatment or sameness approach, in
which women are constructed as the same as men, and thus, ought to be
treated exactly the same as men in law.53 This sameness approach is
invoked in a number of different contexts. It has been used to strike
down provisions that treat women and men differently. It has, however,
also been used to preclude any analysis of the potentially disparate impact
of gender neutral legislation. According to the sameness approach, it is
sufficient that women and men be treated formally equally.
Some feminist approaches endorse this conception of equality
according to which gender difference ought to be irrelevant, and women
ought to be treated exactly the same as men. 54 In this approach, any
recognition of gender difference in the past has simply been a justification

53

54

This approach is exemplified by S. Jahwari, "Women and Constitutional Safeguards
in India", 40 ANDHRA LAW TIMES JOURNAL, 11 (1979) who writes: ["The lnle
meaning of the principle of equality between men and women is that certain natural
differences between men and women is to be treated as normally irrelevant in law,
and that consequently is not to be treated as constituting in itself a sufficient
justification for unequal treatment"].
This approach is associated with the work of Wendy Williams "The Crisis in
Equality Theory and Maternity, Sexuality and Women" 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS
LAW REPORTER 179 (1982), and Williams "Equality's Riddle and Pregnancy and
the Special Treatment/Equal Treatment Debate", 13 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325.
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for discriminating against women. Advocates of this approach for example,
argue that special treatment has historically been a double-edged sword
for women, that is, under the guise of protection, it has been used to
discriminate against women. Any admission of differences between
women and men, and any attempt to accommodate those differences is
seen to provide a justification for continued unequal and discriminatory
treatment.ss For example, the use of gender difference in the past in
prohibiting women to vote, to be elected to government, to be admitted
to the legal profession, and other such participation in the economic,
political and cultural dimensions of society. 56
The third, and most promising approach is a corrective approach, in
which women are seen to require special treatment as a result of past
discrimination. Within this approach, gender difference is often seen as
relevant, and as requiring recognition in law.s7 Under this approach, it is
argued that a failure to take difference into account will only serve to
reinforce and perpetuate the difference and the underlying inequalities.
Proponents of this approach attempt to illustrate how the ostensibly
gender neutral rules of formal equality are not gender neutral at all - but
rather, based on male standards and values. As N audine Taub has argued
"rules formulated in a male-oriented society reflect male needs, male
concerns and male experience."S8 In such a model, women will only
qualify for equality to the extent that they can conform to these male
values and standards. Thus, the corrective approach argues that gender
differences must be taken into account in order to produce substantive
equality for women.
There are some important similarities between the protectionist
approach and the corrective approach. Most significantly, both of these
See generally Williams, "The Crisis in Equality". Id.
For example, in Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130 (1872) 490, the refusal to admit
a woman to the legal profession was upheld by the United States Supreme Court, on
the basis of women's differences.
n See Note, "Towards a Redefmition of Sexual Equality", 95 HARV.L.REV. 487
(1981); Krieger and Cooney, "The Miller-Woh1 Controversy: Equal Treatment,
Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality", 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 513 (1983).
51 N. Taub, Book Review, 80 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1686, 1694 (1980). As
Brodsky and Day, supra note 4, at 149 further note: ["The extreme and persistent
economic and social inequality of women, which is the result of society's bias and
oppression, is obscured by a definition of equality that focuses only on differences
in the form of law. Women are poorer than men, they work in ill-paid female
ghettos. they are the primary care givers for their children and parents, and they are
overwhelmingly, the victims of rape and battery. Simple gender neutrality in law
based on male standards does not address those major inequalities'1.
55
56
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approaches conclude that gender difference can be relevant and therefore
must be recognised in law. However, there are important distinctions
between these approaches. Most notably, the protectionist approach is
more likely to accept both gender differences and special protection as
natural or essential. The corrective approach, on the other hand, is more
likely to consider the basis of the difference, and the impact of recognition
versus non-recognition of the difference, on the lives of women. Gender
difference is not essentialised, but rather, its relevance is seen in the
context of past disadvantage. It other words, gender difference needs to
be recognized because of the extent to which it has historically been the
basis of disadvantage and discrimination.
These approaches to gender difference are often seen to roughly
correspond to the formal and substantive approaches to equality. Both
the protectionist and the sameness approach to gender can be seen to be
based on a formal model of equality, whereas the corrective approach to
gender is based on a substantive model of equality. It is important,
however, that these debates not be collapsed.
The adoption of a
substantive approach to equality does not automatically resolve the
question of the relevance of gender difference. That is, a substantive
approach does not necessarily correspond to a corrective approach to
gender. Rather, it might in a particular context determine that treating
women differently would further contribute to their disadvantage, and
thus conclude that women ought to be treated the same. A substantive
approach to equality, while opening the space for gender difference to be
recognised, does not eradicate the need to make choices regarding when
and how difference ought to be recognised.
The basic inquiry of the substantive approach is whether the impugned
provision contributes to or reinforces the subordination of women. In
some contexts, this substantive approach will require a sameness approach,
whereas in other contexts it will require a corrective approach. For
example, in relation to basic civil and political rights such as the right to
vote and the right to own land, gender would be considered irrelevant in
the pursuit of equality, and any recognition of gender would likely only
contribute to, or reinforce, the subordination of women. In relation to
employment rights, however, a substantive approach may require a
recognition of women's reproductive differences in so far as the pursuit
of equality will require that women are provided with maternity leave
and benefits.
B.

Employment

Sex discrimination challenges in the employment law context can be
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divided into two sets of cases. In the first set, women have challenged
rules, regulations and practices that restrict or prohibit women's
employment. In a second, and smaller set of cases, rules, regulations
and practices that treat women preferentially have been challenged on
the basis that they restrict or prohibit men's employment.
(i)

Restrictions on Women's Employment

Many of the rules, regulations and practices that impose restrictions
on women's employment have been found to violate the equality
guarantees. However, the decisions in this area are not entirely
unproblematic. Firstly, some of the rules and practices which restrict
women's employment have been upheld. Secondly, the approach to
equality and gender difference informing these decisions are often
problematic. The courts have overwhelmingly adopted a formal approach
to equality. The approach to gender difference, however, is divided.
Many judges have adopted a protectionist approach, while others have
adopted a sameness approach.
In Raghuban Saudagar Singh v. State of Punjab,59 a government
order directingthat women were ineligiblefor appointmentsto all positions
in men's jails with the exception of the position of clerks and matrons,
was challenged as discrimination on the basis of sex.60 The Court held
that the order did not constitute discrimination only on the ground of
sex.
It needs no great imagination to visualise the awkward and even
the hazardous position of a woman acting as a warder or other
jail official who has to personally ensure and maintain discipline
over habitual male criminals.61
The Court concluded:
...where disparities of either-sex patently add to or detract from,
the capacity and suitability to hold a particular post or posts,
then the State would be entitled to take this factor into

'9
&0

61

A 1972 P.& H. 117.
The petitioner was a Deputy Superintendent of a women's jail.
government order, she was denied promotion.
Raghuban, supra note 59, at 121 para 17.

As a result of the

Vol. I)

On Women, Equality and the Constitution

23

consideration in conjuncture with others.62
The Court upheld the restriction on women's employment.
In the Raghuban case the Court adopts a fonnal approach to equality,
within which the perceived differences between women and men justify
the differential treatment, and in effect, preclude women's entitlement to
equality. Moreover, the Court adopts a protectionist approach to gender
difference. The Court emphasised the differences in physical strength
between women and men. While a certain level of physical strength
may indeed be a necessary occupational qualification, the Court did not
interrogate whether the gender-based classification was the most reasonable
means of meeting this qualification. Instead of banning an entire class of
candidates, a more reasonable classification might have been based on
ensuring that individual candidates meet the required level of physical
strength. The Court, however, did not consider the reasonableness of the
classification. Rather, physical difference in strength was put forward as
natural gender difference and as applying to all women and all men.
Indeed, the Court seemed to be concerned with differences beyond mere
physical strength. Without exploring the nature of these differences, the
Court concludes that these "patent disparities" would make it awkward,
unsuitable, and indeed, immoral for women to be employed as jail officials.
Underlying the decision appears to be a concern with protecting women,
as the weaker sex, from male prisoners.
In the recent case of Omana Oomen v. FACT Ltd63, female apprentice
trainees were denied the opportunity to write an internal examination on
the basis of restrictions imposed on the working hours of women by 5.66
of the Factories Act. The petitioners contended that they could have
been accommodated in the day shift in which there were several male
technicians and that women technicians had been absorbed in other
divisions of the company. The Court held that the restriction was based
entirely on the basis of sex, and thus violated Articles 14 and 15.
Many constitutional challenges have been directed to employment
rules that specifically restrict the employment of married women. In
Bombay Labour Union v. International Franchise64 a rule requiring an
In further support of this assertion of the fundamental physical differences between
the sexes, the Court quoted from a 1907 United States Supreme Court decision,
Curt Muller v. State of Oregon (1907) 208 U.S. 412 "The two sexes differ in
stJUcture of body, in the functions to be perfonned by each, in the amount of
physical strength...This difference justifies a difference in legislation and upholds
that which is designed to compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her",
" A 1991 Ker. 129.
M A 1966 S.C, 942.

62

24

National Law School Journal

[1993

unmarried woman to give up her position when she married was
challenged.
The rule only applied to a particular department of the
company. The justification put forward by the company for this rule was
the need to work in teams, that attendance must be regular and that there
is greater absenteeism among married women. The Supreme Court held
that there was no evidence that married women were more likely to be
absent than unmarried women.
If it is the presence of children which may be said to account for
greater absenteeism among married women, that would be so
more or less in the case of widows with children also ....The only
difference in the matter of absenteeism that we can see between
married women ...and unmarried women ...is in the matter of
maternity leave which is an extra facility available to married
women. To this extent only, married women are more likely to
be absent than unmarried women and widows. But such absence
can in our opinion be easily provided for by having a few extra
women as leave reserve and can thus hardly be a ground for such
a drastic rule ...65
The Court struck down the restriction on women's employment.
In C.B. Muthamma v. Union of India and Others,66 the petitioner, a
successful candidate in the Indian Foreign Service, was refused
appointment because she was married. The rules of the Indian Foreign
Service, prohibiting the appointment of married women, and requiring
that unmarried women in the employment of the Foreign Service obtain
permission before marrying, were challenged. The Supreme Court held:
If a woman member shall obtain the permission of government
before she marries, the same risk is run by government if a male
member contracts a marriage.
If the family and domestic
commitments of a woman member of the Service is unlikely to
come in the way of efficient discharge of duties, a similar situation
may well arise in the case of a male member. In these days of
nuclear families, intercontinental marriages and unconventional
behaviour, one fails to understand the naked bias against the
gentler of the species.67

., Id. At 944 pArA 3.
66
A 1979 S.C. 1868.
67 Id. at 1870 para 5.
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The Court held that although the rule is discriminatory, the application
should be dismissed in light of the subsequent promotion of the petitioner.
However, the Court concluded by strongly urging the Government to
"overhaul all Service Ru1es to remove the stain of sex discrimination."68
The Court adopted a formal approach to equality, and a sameness
approach to gender. For the purposes of employment in the Foreign
Service, women and men are to be considered the same. According to
the Court, women and men must both balance the demands of work and
family. Women and men must therefore be treated the same in law.
However, the Court is cautious in its adoption of this sameness approach,
and in fact, goes on to limit its applicability:
We do not mean to universalise or dogmatise that men and
women are equal in all occupations and all situations and do not
exclude the need to pragmatise where the requirements of
particular employment, the sensitivities of sex or the peculiarity
of societal sectors or the handicaps of either sex may compel
selectivity. 69
The sameness approach is thus expressly limited to the particular
circumstances of the particu1ar case. The Court leaves open the possibility
of adopting an approach which recognises differences.
Indeed, the
discourse of the decision suggests an underlying protectionism. The
references to women as "the gentler of the species", suggests that the
Court does see women as different, as weaker, and as in need of protection.
Indeed, the recurring references to women as "the weaker" and "the
gentler" sex reinforces images of women as weak, and in need of
protection.70
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza 71 air hostesses challenged the
discriminatory employment conditions for air hostesses and stewards.
The Supreme Court upheld a contractual condition permitting the
termination of an air hostess's services on her marriage within the first
four years, but invalidated a condition that terminated her services on her

68
69
70

71

Id. at 1870 para 9.
Id. at 1870 para 7.
While the Court's references to misogynous and masculinist culture suggest that
women's differences are the prOductof these oppressive relations, (the Court writes,
for example, "This misogynous posture is a hangover of the masculine culture of
manacling the weaker sex forgetting how our struggle for national freedom was also
a battle against mens thraldom." Id. at para 3.) these references are at least in part
undermined by references which suggest that women are naturally and essentially
weak.
A 1981 S.C. 1829.
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first pregnancy. The Supreme Court began with a review of the basic
principles of reasonable classification under Article 14,72 and set out the
criteria for determining the distinct classes.73 Based on this test, the
Court concluded that Air Hostesses constituted a separate class of Air
India employees. The Court considered the list of circumstances, noting
the differences in recruitment, terms and conditions of service, the
promotional avenues, and other "special attributes" between Air Hostess
(AHs) and Assistant Flight Pursers (AFPs) , and concluded that AHs
were distinct from the class of AFPs.
The Court then considered the challenge to the restriction on marriage.
The restriction was upheld on the grounds that it fostered the State
family planning programme, that women would be more mature to handle
and make a marriage work successfully if forced to wait four years, as
well as on the grounds of the financial hardship the corpoljltion would
incur should the bar to marriage be removed.74 The Court concluded that
the treatment of the "fair sex" in this regulation is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable, and thus does not violate Article 14.
The Court subsequently examined the regulation requiring AHs to
retire upon their first pregnancy. According to the Court, the dismissal of
a pregnant AH "[a]mounts to compelling the poor AH not to have any
children and thus interfere with and divert the ordinary course of human
nature."
It seems to us that the termination of the services of an AH
72

73

7.

In reviewing the doctrine of reasonable classification, the Court adopts the standard
formulation of equality as sameness, according to which likes must be treated alike.
The Court writes, for example [" (3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are
treated differently without any reasonable bias. (4) Where equals and unequals are
treated differently, Article 14 would have no application"]. Id. at 1842 para 37.
These criteda include, "(a) the nature, the mode and the manner of recruitment of a
particular category (b) the classifications of the particular category (c) the terms
and conditions of service of the members of the category (d) the nature and
character of the posts and promotional avenues (e) the special attributes that the
particular category possess which are not to be found in other classes and the like."
Id.
The Court held ["Apart from improving the health of the employee, it helps a good
deal in the promotion and boosting up of our family planning programme. Secondly,
if a woman marries near about the age of 20 to 23 years, she becomes fully mature
and there is every chance of such a marriage proving a success all things being
equal. Thirdly, it has been rightly pointed out to us by the Corporation that if the
bar of marriage within four years of service is removed then the Corporation will
have to incur huge expenditure in recruiting additional AHs either on a temporary
or on ad hoc basis to replace the working AHs if they conceive and any period short
of fours years would be too little a time for the Corporation to phase out such an
ambitious plan'1~ Id. at 1850 para 78.
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under such circumstances is not only a callous and cruel act but
an open insult to Indian womanhood - the most sacrosanct and
cherished institution. We are constrained to observe that such a
course of action is extremely detestable and abhorrent to the
notions of a civilized society. Apart from being grossly unethical,
it smacks of a deep rooted sense of utter selfishness at the cost of
all human values. 75
The Court concluded that the pregnancy restriction was unreasonable
and arbitrary, and thus in violation of Article 14.76
The Air India case illustrates the problems with a formal approach to
equality, as well as with an approach to gender equality informed by the
narrow sameness/difference debate. Firstly, the formal approach to
equality, and its similarly situated test is used to preclude any analysis of
substantive inequality between male and female employees. The Court
uses the very discrimination between these two groups of employees to
distinguish
between them -that is, the practice of institutional
discrimination against AHs is used in the very definition of classes. As
a result of the history of discriminatory treatment between a group of
female and male employees, the Court was able to conclude that the
classes are distinct, and that no comparison needs to be made between
them for the purposes of Article 14. For example, rather than considering
the problematic nature of the distinctions between the recruitment
requirements for the AHs and AFPs, the Court uses the difference
requirements regarding marital status as between AHs and AFPs as a
factor in concluding that these employees are different. The circularity
of the approach is evident - past institutional discrimination (AHs/women
must be unmarried; AFPs/men need not be) is thereby used to preclude
any analysis of institutional disc.rimination (AHs/women and AFPs/men
are distinct classes).
Secondly, while some have looked favourably on the decision,77 the

7S
76

77

Id. at 1850 para 80.
In a more recent case against Air India, Lena Khan v. Union of India, A 1987 S.C.
1515, the regulations which required air hostesses employed in India to retire at age
35, with extension to age 45, but which allowed air hostesses employed outside
India to continue employment beyond age 45, was challenged as violative of
Articles 14 and 15. The Supreme Court held that such discrimination should not be
allowed merely because it complies with local law abroad. However, in light of Air
India's submissions that it would phase out air hostesses recruited outside of India
at age 45, the Court concluded that no intervention was required at this time.
See Rani Jethmalani, "India: Law and Women" in EMPOWERMENT AND THE
LAW:STRATEGIES FOR THIRD WORLD WOMEN 61 (M. Schuler ed. 1986).
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Court's approach to gender difference is quite problematic. In recognising
differences in the context of marriage, the approach adopted by the Court
was protectionist - women need to be treated differently to protect them.
In recognising difference in the context of pregnancy and maternity, the
approach adopted by the Court was also protectionist and essentialist.
Pregnancy and maternity were not simply seen as a biological difference
which, in the interest of treating women equally, must be recognised.
Rather, in the Court's view, it was a also difference in the roles of
women and men, according to which women are not only responsible for
child bearing, but also for child rearing. In this view, women's role as
mothers is seen as natural and a product of biology, rather than product
of the sexual division of labour. The approach adopted by the Court
was based upon, and served to reinforce, the ideology of motherhood
that has been constructed
around these physical differences.78
Notwithstanding the fact that the Court struck down the pregnancy
restriction on women's employment, its understanding of women as
different precluded an analysis of the sexist ideologies that continue to
inform systemic gender discrimination.
In Maya Devi v. State of Maharashtra79, a requirement that married
women obtain their husbands consent before applying for public
employment was challenged as violating Articles 14, 15 and 16. The
Supreme Court held:
This is a matter purely personal between husband and wife. It is
unthinkable that in social conditions presently prevalent a husband
can prevent a wife from being independent economically just for
his whim or caprice.80
The Court emphasised the importance of economic independence for
women, and the importance of not creating conditions that discourage
such independence.
The consent requirement
was held to be
unconstitutional.
In this case, the Court was of the view that consent

11

'19
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Indeed, even the physical difference that is being recognised is one loaded with
social meaning - pregnancy is simply a biological difference, but it is seen as "a
natural consequence of married life". For example in reviewing the American case
law on sex discrimination and pregnancy, the court made the following observation
: ••...pregnancy ...is not a disability but one of the natural consequences of marriage
and is an immutable characteristic of married life. Any distinction, therefore, made
on the ground of pregnancy cannot-but be held to be extremely arbitrary". Supra
note 71, 1852 para 88.
1986 1 S.C.R. 743.
Id. at 745.
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requirements were an anachronistic obstacle to women's equality. In
order to achieve economic independence women must not, at least in this
regard, be treated differently than men. The decision might be seen to
reflect a formal model of equality, and a sameness approach to gender
difference which requires that women and men be treated the same.
However, the decision also supports a more substantive approach to
equality - that is - a recognition that the consent requirement contributed
to the subordination of women. The case exemplifies how a substantive
approach to equality may still require a choice to be made about the
relevance of gender. In this case, an inquiry into whether the rule
contributed to or reinforced women's subordination revealed that in this
particular context, gender ought to be irrelevant, and thus, a sameness
approach was appropriate.
(ii)

Preferential Treatment

Several cases have involved challenges to employment rules,
regulations and practices that treat women preferentially, on the basis
that such preferential treatment discriminates against men. The results
of these cases have been mixed. In those cases where the employment
rules have been upheld, the Court has adopted a more substantive approach
which recognizes that equality may require differential treatment. For
example, in Shamsher Singh v. State81 the employment practices of the
State educational system were challenged as violating Article 16(2). The
educational system had two branches, one run exclusively by women,
the other, exclusively by men. In the women's branch, Assistant District
Inspectors were granted a special pay increase.
The educational
department was subsequently reorganised, and as a result both male and
female Assistant District Inspectors were designated as Block Education
Officers. Both the women and men were performing identical duties.
The male petitioner challenged the pay increase as sex discrimination,
and as violative of Article 16(2). The question referred to the Full Bench
of the High Court was whether Article 15(3) could be invoked to interpret
article 16(2). In response, the Court held that Articles 14, 15 and 16
constitute a single code, and that Article 15(3) could thereby be invoked
to determme the scope of Article 16(2).82 The petition was dismissed
and the pay increase upheld.
In those cases where employment rules have been struck down, the
Court has adopted a formal approach to equality, and a sameness approach
II Supra note 26.
12

Id. at 376 para 19.
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to gender difference. For example, in Walter Alfred Baid v. Union of
India,83 a recruitment rule in a school of nursing, a predominantly female
institution, which made male candidates ineligible for the position of
senior nurse tutor, was struck down as violating Article 16(2). The
Court held that Article 16(2) did not permit a classification on the basis
of sex.
Article 16(2) incorporates a concept of absolute equality between
the sexes in matters of employment which is underscored by the
absence of any saving in the other clauses in relation to sex.84
The Court thereby adopted a formal approach to equality, according
to which women and men are to be treated the same for purposes of
employment. This sameness approach does not allow for any difference
in treatment on the basis of sex - including a difference in treatment
which may advantage women.
With regard to the relevance of gender difference, the Court further
stated that although "it is true that there are patent physical disparities
between the two sexes", such differences could not justify differential
treatment without violating Article 16(2):
It is too late, therefore, for anyone to suggest that there is an area
of human activity for which women as a class are ineligible or
any work for which all women are unfit. 8S
While recognising certain physical differences as natural, the Court
adopted a sameness approach to gender difference, that is, for the purpose
of the law, any such gender difference should be irrelevant.
In concluding that the classification in question was one based on
sex, the Court rejected the distinction "between sex and what it implied".86
This rejection of the narrow interpretation of "only on the ground of sex"
opened the possibility of recognising the extent to which gender differences
are socially constructed and bringing these social dimensions of difference

13 Supra note 32.
MId. at 306 para 10.
ss Id. at 307 para 10.
16 ["Considerations which have their genesis in sex and arise out of it would not be
saved by such a discrimination. What could save such a discrimination is any
ground or reason independently of sex such as socio-economic conditiollli, miUtiw
status, and other disqualifying conditions such as age, background, health, academic
accomplishments, etc'1. Id. at 308 para 10.
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within the folds of the equality guarantees of the Constitution. In the
context of a substantive model of equality, this approach would allow
the Courts to address the broad range of socially constructed inequalities
that women suffer - from economic dependency to educational
disadvantage. However, in the W.A. Baid case, this understanding of
gender difference was coupled with a sameness approach, whereby any
difference, whether natural or otherwise, ought to be irrelevant for the
purposes of the law. As a result of the formal approach to equality, and
sameness approach to gender difference, the Court found that the gender
specific recruitment rule violated Article 16(2). The effect of this approach
was to preclude any analysis of the purpose of the differential in treatment,
and thus, any consideration of whether the differential in treatment was
intended to advantage or disadvantage women. Further, the particular
examples used by the Court to distinguish between those factors implied
by sex, and those factors which are not, were also problematic.87 Socioeconomic conditions, marital status, health and education are all factors
that may be relevant to sex, if measured in terms of the substantive
inequality of women, and in respect of which a corrective approach to
gender difference may thus be required.
C.

Civil and Political Rights

The constitutional challenges to legislation dealing with civil and
political rights can be divided into three sets of cases. In the first set,
women have challenged legislation that restricts their rights to own land.
In the second set of cases, legislation that provides reservations for
women have been challenged as discriminatory. These reservations have
been upheld. A third set of cases raises some of the problems in the
classification of legislation as preferential.
(i)

Restrictions on Land Ownership

In Pritam Kaur v. State of Pepsu,88 Section 5(2)(a) of the Pepsu
Court of Wards Act was challenged as in violation of Article 15(1).
Section 5(2) authorised the government to make an order directing that
property of a landholder be placed under the supervision of the Court of
Wards, if the landholder was incapable of managing his affairs. Section
5(2)(a) authorised such an order if a landholder "by reason of being a

~ Id.
a A 1963 P.& H. 9.
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The Court noted:

To be a woman is an additional reason on the basis of which the
Government can deprive her of the management of her estate. In
other words, if a man mismanages his estate, that mismanagement
will not render his estate liable to be taken over by the Court of
Wards unless his case falls under anyone of clauses (b), (c) and
(d) of section 5(2) of the Act. Whereas in the case of a woman
it can be so taken merely for the reason that she is a woman.89
The Court concluded that section 5(2) of the Act discriminated on the
basis of sex, and thus violated Article 15.
However, two subsequent cases dealing with restrictions on women's
land ownership have been upheld. In Sucha Singh Bajwa & Sadhu Singh
Bajwa v. The State of Punjab90, section 5 of the Punjab Land Reforms
Act was challenged as violating Article 15 on the grounds that it allowed
the holder or owner of the land to select the separate permissible area in
respect of adult sons, but not adult daughters. The High Court held:
The subject of the legislation is the person owning or holding
land, and not his or her children ...[Since] every person described
in section 5 whether male or female is allowed the same
permissible area and there is no discrimination qua one land
owner and the other on the ground of sex ...91
The Court further held that the distinction was not made on the
ground of sex alone, but rather "also for reason that a daughter has to go
to another family after her marriage in due course."92 The Court upheld
the restriction.
The decision highlights the ways in which classification
and
comparison can be manipulated within a formal equality approach. The
Court defines the relevant comparison as one between the landholders.
Accordingly, since there is no discrimination between male and female
landholders, the provision is not seen to discriminate on the basis of sex.
While the discrimination as between sons and daughters on the face of
the legislation might be seen to offend even a formal approach to equality,
the Court evades this question by simply defining this comparison between
19
!lO

Id. at 16 para 17.
A 1974 P.& H. 162.
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potential recipients as irrelevant.
Further, the Court's approach to gender is also problematic.
In
support of its decision, the Court resorts to the doctrine of "only on the
grounds of sex" and argues that there are other factors not based on sex
that justify the differential treatment of a daughter, such as the fact that
daughters go to another family after marriage. The reasoning exemplifies
the problematic distinction between sex and what it implies, that is, the
failure to explore the connections between such customary practices and
the social construction of gender. The practice of daughters leaving their
natural families on marriage is a product of the social organization of
gender, and the roles that women are expected to assume. The practice
is, in other words, one that is implied by sex. By focussing narrowly on
sex, the Court fails to see the necessary connection between sex and
what sex implies. Stereotypes of women are used as justification for
differential treatment, without any real ~alysis of disadvantage, nor any
attempt to explore the extent to which these stereotypical roles of women
have served to reinforce women's inequality.
In Nalini Ranjan Singh and others v. The State93, Section 2 (ee) of
the Bihar Land Reforms Act was challenged as violating Article 15. The
definition of family in the section did not include an adult daughter, for
the purposes of claiming a separate unit of land, and was thus alleged to
discriminate as between adult daughters and adult sons. On the basis of
principles of Hindu personal law, the Court held that daughters are not
members of the coparcenary.
Although a daughter can be a member of a joint Hindu Undivided
Family, she cannot be given a status as a coparcener in a
coparcenary,
even after the commencement
of the
Constitution ...There are various factors which sanction that while
a son may be a member of a coparcenary, a daughter may not.
As a necessary corollary it follows that the very same reasons
which justify the discrimination between a son and a daughter in
a coparcenary apply with force to any attack on the validity of
the impugned legislation as being violative of Article 15(1).94
The Court thus upheld the restriction.
(ii)

Reservations
The cases dealing with constitutional challenges to reservations for

93

A 1977 Pat. 171.

MId. at 179 para 8-A.
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women in political institutions have been upheld. In Dattatraya Motiram
More v. Bombay,9S s. 10(1)(c) of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs 1925
Act for the reservation of seats for' women was challenged as violating
Articles 14, 15 and 16. With regard to Article 15, the Court adopted the
approach that Article 15(3) must be interpreted as a proviso to Article
15(1), and that Article 15(1) prohibited discrimination "only on the ground
of sex", and that Articles 15(1) and 15(3) together allowed the State to
discriminate in favour of women against men, but not to discriminate in
favour of men against women. The Court held that the reservations did
not constitute a classification only on the ground of sex, but rather, was
the result of "other considerations besides the fact that the persons
belonging to that class are of a particular sex".96
There is force in the Advocate General's argument that if
Government have discrimination in favour of women in reserving
seats for them, it is not only on the ground that they are women,
but there are various other factors that come into play. It is said
that even today women are more backward than men. It is the
duty of the State to raise the position of women to that of men.97
The decision can be seen to be informed by a substantive model of
equality and a corrective approach to gender, in so far as the Court
recognizes that the social and historic inequality of women must be
recognised in order to overcome this inequality. However, some aspects
of the decision limit this progressive approach.
For example, the
substantive understanding of equality remains limited by the discourse of
formal equality apparent in the narrow technical reading of Article 15(1),
and of "only", as well as the use of the term discrimination to imply any
difference in treatment
Similarly, the understanding of difference is
problematic in so far as the Court separates sex from what sex implies the recognition of the social inequality of women is not seen as based on
sex. This distinction reinforces an understanding of sex difference as
natural and biological.
In K.R. Gopinath Nair v. The Senior Inspector cum Special Sale
Officer of Cooperative Societies and Others,98 the Kerala High Court
held that section 28 A of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act which
provided for the reservation of a seat in the committee of every cooperative
9' Supra note 17.
96
97
98

Id. at 313 para 7.
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society did not violate Articles 14 and 15. The Court held that the
provision of special measures for women and children has been recognised
in Article 15, as well as being one of the proclaimed directive principles
of State policy in Article 38. The Court stated:
Even on a global view, women still suffer the pangs of inequality,
though women constitute about 50% of the population, effective
participation in the political administration is, to them, still a
teasing illusion.99
The Court then concludes that
...s 28A is a small step in the correct and progressive direction in
offsetting the ill effects of age old handicaps of women. 100
The decision can be seen to be based on a substantive approach to
equality, in which the Court examines whether the provision in question
contributes to women's subordination. The Court's inquiry reveals that
the provision, which treats women differently, is specifically intended to
eradicate historic discrimination against women, and thus, that a
substantive approach to equality in this context requires a corrective
approach to gender difference.
(iii)

Civil Procedure:

In Mahadeb Jiew v. Dr. RB. SenlOl, a provision of the Civil Procedure
Code, which gave the courts discretion to order security for costs where
the plaintiff is a woman, and does not possess sufficient immoveable
property in India, was challenged as discrimination on the basis of sex.
The Court held that the discrimination was not on the basis of sex alone,
but rather, also involved property considerations.
Possession of sufficient immoveable property in India is not a
consideration bearing on sex at all ...The basic criterion is ...that
the person who is ordered to secure for costs is one who has not
sufficient property out of which to pay the successful litigant's
costs. 102

"
100
101
102

Id. at
Id. at
Supra
Supra

168 para 8.
169 para 13.
note 17.
note 17 at 568 para 29.
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The Court thus upheld the provision. The Court was unmoved by the
fact that men without sufficient immoveable property in India were not
required to provide security for costs. It simply insisted that the
discrimination could not be said to be on the basis of sex alone, but on
the combined grounds of sex and property.
The case exemplifies the problematic and indeed dangerous potential
of the 'only on the ground of sex' approach. whereby virtually any factor
or characteristic can be added to the sex discrimiriation and thereby make
the discrimination not only on the ground of sex. Moreover, the failure
to inquire into the question of the social and economic disadvantage of
women precludes any consideration of assumptions informing this rule.
The distinction between women and men without sufficient immoveable
property can be seen to be based on the underlying assumption that
women do not have any source of income -they do not work outside of
the home -and therefore, will not be able to pay for costs. Men, on the
other hand, are assumed to work outside the home, and thus, presumed
to be able to pay for costs. The sexual division of labour has operated to
make many women economically dependent. However, the classification
is too broad. Some women may well work outside the home; men may
be unemployed. The 'only on the grounds of sex' test, fails to reveal and
interrogate the validity these underlying assumptions. While the objective
of the provision is legitimate - that is, ensuring that plaintiffs have
sufficient means to pay costs - this objective is not well served by
criteria on the basis of sex.
In Shahdad v. Mobd Abdullah103 the provisions of the Civil Procedure
Code, which state that service of a summons must be made on a male
member of the family, were challenged as violating Article_IS.
In
rejecting the challenge, the Court held:
... we have to analyse the background in which this rule was
enacted. The functions of females in Indian society is that of
housewives. Until very recently it was in exceptional cases that
ladies took part in any other activity than those of housewives.
Females were mostly illiterate and some of them Parda Nashin.
Therefore in enacting this rule, the legislature had in view the
special conditions of the Indian society and therefore enjoined
service only upon male members and did not regard service on
females as sufficient. 104

103

Supra note 18.
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Id. at 127 para 32.
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The Court noted that Article 15(3) is intended "to cover any provision
specially made for women" and that the provision:
... does not give them any disadvantageous position but rather
exonerates them from the responsibility of fastening notice of
service as service of the other members of the family.los
After noting other provisions which "confer special privileges upon a
protection to women" which have been upheld by the courts, the Court
concluded that the service provisions of the Civil Procedure Code did
not constitute discrimination on the basis of sex. 106
The decision is based on a formal approach to equality, in which any
difference can be used to justify differential treatment, and a protectionist
approach to gender, in which women are seen as different and as in need
of protection.
The Court seized upon women as housewives as a
difference which justified the differential treatment of women and men
in law. The approach did not challenge the stereotype of women as
housewives; it did not examine the extent to which these stereotypes of
women have served to reinforce women's inequality - nor the extent to
which the underlying sexual division of labour has produced such
inequality.
Rather, the difference is taken as natural. The decision
exemplifies the way in which the recognition of gender difference under
the guise of protection can perpetuate women's subordination.
The
recognition of the difference in the sexual division of labour serves only
to reinforce the negative stereotypes of women as housewives.
Moreover, in the Court's protectionist view, the fact that women are
not subject to service is seen as preferential rather than restrictive treatment
for women. The protectionist approach blinds the Court to the fact that
such a differential in treatment accords women less than equal rights and
responsibilities, and thus renders them less than equal members of the
family.
From the perspective of substantive equality, the legislation
could be seen to disadvantage women. However, even within a substantive
approach to equality and a corrective approach to gender, it might be
necessary to recognize gender difference in this case. It could be argued
that the continuing sexual division of labour and the resulting inequalities

10S
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Id. at 127 para 33.
The Court referred to the decisions regarding the provisions adultery under section
497 of the Indian Penal Code, A 1953 M.B. 147 and the maintenance provisions
under Section 488 of the Civil Procedure Code, A 1952 Mad 529. ["These authorities
therefore lend support to the view that in enacting O.5 r. 15 there is no discrimination
between a woman and a man simply on the ground of his or her sex on reCeiving a
notice on behalf of some other member of the family'1.
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of women within the family are such that women ought not be burdened
with equal responsibilities until such time as they have equal rights.
This was not, however, the approach in Shahdad, where the Court merely
seized upon a perceived difference, and justified differentiation of
treatment. 107
D. Criminal Law
Constitutional
challenges have been brought to the adultery,
maintenance, prostitution and bail provisions of the criminal law. Unlike
the employment cases, these sex discrimination cases have been largely
unsuccessful. The Courts have primarily adopted a formal approach to
equality and a protectionist approach to gender difference.
(i)

Adultery

The Supreme Court has considered several challenges to section 497
of the Indian Penal Code, which makes only adultery committed by a
man an offence, and section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
which allows only the husband of the "adulteress" to prosecute the men
with whom she committed adultery, but does not allow the wife of that
man to prosecute him. In Abdul Aziz v. BombayI08, the accused, charged
with committing adultery under s.497, challenged the section as
discriminating on the basis of sex, and in violation of Articles 14 and 15.
The High Court concluded that the difference of treatment was not based
on sex but rather, on the social position of women in India. On appeal,
the Supreme Court held that any challenge under 15(1) was met by
15(3). The Court rejected the argument that 15(3) "should be confined
to provisions which are beneficial to women and cannot be used to give
them a licence to commit and abet crimes".I09 The Court held
Article 14 is general and must be read with the other provisions
107
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109

In Smt Savitri Aggarwal v. K.K. Bose, A 1972 All. 305 an order granting a hotel
bar licence for the sale of foreign liquor was challenged as violating Article 15.
The District Excise Officer had granted the license on the basis of sex, observing
that certain applications "deserve sympathetic consideration as they are ladies."
The Allahabad High Court held that such a preference in the granting of licen,ses did
not constitute a special provision for women pursuant to Article 15(3). "What
Article 15(3) contemplates is the making of special provision for women as a class
and not the making of provisions for an individual women." The Court allowed the
petition, and quashed the order granting the licence.
Supra note 26.
Id. at 322 para 5.

Vol. I]

On Women, Equality and the Constitution

39

which set out the ambit of fundamental rights. Sex is a sound
classification and although there can be no discrimination in
general on that ground, the Constitution itself provides for special
provisions in the case of women and children. 110
The Court thus upheld the adultery provisions as beneficial to women.
The Court adopted the "holistic approach" to Article 15, and thereby
seemed to endorse the view that equality may require that disadvantaged
groups be treated differently, and in fact, preferentially. However, the
Court's understanding of discrimination - that is - of any distinction on
the prohibited grounds - is suggestive of a more formal approach to
equality. Notwithstanding the Court's statement that the Articles should
be read together, it seems to understand the preferential treatment allowed
by Article 15(3) as an exception to equality. Moreover, it is not clear
whether the adultery laws do in fact treat women preferentially. On one
level, there is an obvious benefit to not being subject to criminal
prosecution. Yet, at another level, the adultery laws are based on
problematic assumptions about women, about women's sexuality and
about the relationships between women and men. Women are seen as
the passive victims of aggressive male sexuality, incapable of agency in
sexual relations, and needy of protection. Within this understanding,
adultery is seen as the fault of the man; a woman is simply his hapless
victim; and not to be blamed. The failure to interrogate the adultery
provisions at a deeper level leaves these assumptions in place, and the
adultery provisions continue to reinforce underlying social inequalities.
The Court's approach, wherein any differential in treatment can be seen
to be beneficial, and any benefit can be seen to fall within Article 15(3),
thus fails to adequately consider the questions of inequality and
subordination.
In Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India11!, Section 497 of the Indian
Penal Code was challenged as unconstitutional by a woman whose
husband had prosecuted her lover for adultery. She argued that the
section was discriminatory because the husband had a right to prosecute
the adulterer. The wife, on the other hand, had no right to prosecute
either her adulterous husband or the woman with whom the husband had
committed adultery. In addition, she argued that the section did not take
into account situations where the husband had sexual relations with an
unmarried woman. In dismissing the petition. the Court held that
confining the definition of adultery to men was not discriminatory as
110
111

Id. at 322 para 6.
A 1985 S.C. 1618.
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"[I]t is commonly accepted that it is the man who is the seducer and not
the woman."112
Again, in the Court's view, a wife who is involved in an adulterous
relationship is the victim rather than the author of the crime. The offence
is committed against the sanctity of the matrimonial home and it is the
man who defiles that sanctity.1l3
The Court's decision was firmly located within a formal equality
approach. The challenge was not allowed on the grounds that in the
context of adultery, women and men are different. Further, the Court
clearly articulated its protectionist approach to gender difference. The
man was regarded as the seducer and the author of the crime. The
approach essentialises women as passive, as incapable of agency in sexual
relations, and as victims. Moreover, in the Court's view, these differences
were seen as natural. 114
Yet, even within this view, it is not clear why the wife of the
adulterer cannot prosecute him. This question is more directly addressed
by the Court in, Revathi v. Union of India,l1s section 497 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure were
again upheld. According to the Court, these provisions:
...go hand in hand and constitute a legislative packet to deal with
the offence committed by an outsider to the matrimonial unit
and poisons the relationship between the two partners constituting
the matrimonial unit and the community punishes the "outsider"
who breaks into the matrimonial home and occasions the violation
of sanctity of the matrimonial tie by developing an illicit
relationship with one of the spouses .. ,u6
The fact that the wife of the adulterer is expressly prohibited from
prosecuting her husband is the only exception to the general rule that
anyone can set the criminal law in motion. This exception is based on a
112
113
114

Id. at 1620 para 6.
Id. at 1620 para 7.
In upholding the adultery pnlVisions, the Court further held that the underinclusive
defInition was not discriminatory.
This holding reinforces the courts position on
relations between married men and unmarried women, who are often prostitute
women. Prostitute women are different from all other women and thus entitled to

115

less legal rights or protection than all other women. Such women belie the patriarchal
construction of female sexuality as passive. Their agency is considered a threat to
the family and the matrimonial relationship and therefore, the law operates primarily
against them.
A 1988 S.C. 835.

116

Id. at 838 para 5.
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particular understanding of the nature of the harm caused by adultery.
Adultery is seen as a violation of a husband's property rights over his
wife; more specifically, of his wife's sexuality. It is not a violation of a
wife's rights since she is not seen as having the same claim to her
husband. Thus, it is only the husband who can prosecute an adulterer
since he is the only one who is seen to have suffered a harm. This basic
difference in the understanding of adultery, a difference that is seen as
natural, is used to justify the differential treatment, and thereby uphold
the law. The underlymg sexist assumptions, again, remain uninterrogated.
(ii)

Maintenance

Several challenges have been made to s.488 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which requires men to pay maintenance in favour of their
wives, but imposes no corresponding duty on women to maintain their
husbands. In Thamsi Goundan v. Kanni Ammal117, this provision was
challenged as violating Article 14. The Court, in adopting the reasonable
classification approach, held that the classification was based on the
difference between men and women.
Women as a whole suffer from several disabilities from which
men do not suffer. They have no right at least under Hindu law
to participate along with their brothers in the inheritance to the
property of their parents .....Instances can be multiplied without
number to show how women have not equal rights with men.
That as a class they are weaker than men cannot also be disputed.
In fact they are even called by the appellation "Weaker Sex".
The very provision in clause 3 of Article 15, that special provision
may be made for women, suggests the existence of disparity. 118
The Court held that section 488 "applies to all women in similar
circumstances", that is, to all women deserted by their husbands, and
that "(l)egislation in favour of this class of people" is not arbitrary. 119
The Court adopted a formal approach to equality regarding Article
14, according to which only those who are similarly situated are to be
treated the same. Women, and more specifically, wives deserted by their
husbands, are not the same as men, and therefore need not be trejited the
same. Moreover, Article 15(3) allows for special treatment of this class
117

A 1952 Mad. 529.

118

Id. at 530. para 3.

119

Id,
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of women. The Court's approach to gender is thus one of emphasizing
the difference.
The Court recognised that there has been historical
discrimination against women insofar as they have been denied property
rights. Yet it proceeded to treat the difference between men and women
as natural, and in so doing, adopted a protectionist approach. The Court
explicitly stated women are weaker than men and thus, in need of
protection. There is no further interrogation of the deeper relationships of
oppression that create these inequalities, such as the sexual division of
labour which renders women economically dependent on men.120
In K. Shanmukhan v. G. Sarojini121 section 124 (1) (b) of the Criminal
Procedure Code was challenged as being in violation of Article 14 by
discriminating between divorcees and wives whose marriages were
subsisting. The provision entitles a divorced woman to maintenance,
while a married woman is not entitled to maintenance if she refuses to
live with her husband without sufficient reason, lives in adultery or lives
separately by mutual consent.
The Court adopted the reasonable
classification test, and held that the classification was based on intelligible
differentia.
In the Court's view divorced women and married women were
differently situated. The conditions stipulated in the impugned legislation
could only apply to married women; they were, by their very nature,
inapplicable to divorced women. Similarly, the Court observed that
divorced women were disentitled to maintenance in situations which do
not apply to married women, such as, when divorced women remarry.
The Court adopted a formal approach to equality, according to which the
differences between married and divorced women were deemed to be
sufficient to defeat the challenge. There is no interrogation of whether
the legal treatment disadvantages wives.
Further, the approach to difference is essentialist - that is -in the
Court's view, the differences between married women and divorced
women were seen as natural, as part of the nature of the institution of
marriage.
There was no consideration of the extent to which these
differences are in fact a product of the legal regulation of marriage - that
120

121

In Gupteshwar Pandey vs. Smt. Ram Peari Devi, A 1971 Pat. 181 the Court again
held that s.488 was a special provision designed for the benefit or protection of
women or children whose husbands or fathers failed to maintain them in spite of
sufficient means, and thus within the scope of Article 15(3). The Court again
adopts a formal approach to equality, within which Article 15(3) is understood as an
exception to equality, and a protectionist approach to gender difference, according
to which s.488 is justified on the basis that women are the weaker sex, and in need
of special protection.
1981 Cr.L.J. 830 (Ker.).
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is - married women and divorced women are different because the law
treats them differently. Rather than considering the question of economic
dependence and economic need, a criteria according to which married
and divorced women may be similarly situated, the Court justified the
differential entitlement of maintenance on the basis of the accepted
differences. The case illustrates how virtually any difference, including
those differences created solely through law, can be found to be intelligible
criteria, and thereby satisfy the reasonable classification test of the formal
equality approach.
The constitutionality of section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code
has been considered in a number of cases. These cases have involved
applications for maintenance under section 125, and although the Courts
have referred to the equality provisions, the cases are not strictly speaking,
constitutional challenges. In Musu. S3hida Begum v. Md. Mofizul
Haquel22, the Court held that if the personal law was held to be final,
with the conclusion that a divorced woman cannot claim any further
maintenance beyond the period of iddat, a discrimination would occur
between the divorced muslim woman and divorced women belonging to
other religions or castes. The court rejected the challenge.
The court can be seen to have based its decision on a substantive
approach to equality in so far as it considered how the difference in this
instance disadvantages.
Religion cannot be a basis for reasonable
classification. The court upheld the premise on which maintenance was
granted, which is economic necessity. It clearly states that the relevant
criteria must be economic necessity, and that the section is meant to
protect the distresses of all wives, including divorced women, irrespective
of religion or castes, for their future life until remarriage. At the same
time the Court does not outline the reasons for women's economic
dependence. It is stated as a fact, and the implicit assumption is that it is
a natural and unalterable condition of women. 123
122

123

1986 Cr. LJ. 102 (Ori.).
In Balan Nair v Bhavani Aroma Valsalamma, A 1987 Ker. 110. the Kerala High
Court commented, in obiter, on section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code:
Though s. 125 benefits a distressed father also, main thrust of the provision
is to assist women and children in distress. That is fully consistent with
Article 15(3) of the Constitution which states that the prohibition contained
in the Article shall not prevent the State from making any special provision
for women and children ....The provision is a meaSure of social justice and
specially enacted to protect women and children.
The Court held that the provision was consistent with Article 15(3) and could
benefit a distressed father although the main thrust was to assist women and
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Prostitution

Several challenges have been made to the provisions of the
Suppression of Immoral Traffic (prevention) in Women and Children
Act (PITA). Two early cases involved challenges to section 20 of PITA.
Section 20 permits the removal of prostitutes from any area in the interests
of the general public. The magistrate is further empowered to prohibit
the prostitute woman from re-entering the place from which she has been
removed. In Smt. Sham a Bai v State of Uttar Pradesh, 124 section 20
was challenged by a prostitute woman. She argued that prostitution was
her hereditary trade, that it was the only means of her livelihood and that
members of her family were economically dependent on her. The writ
was filed primarily to prevent her landlord from using the provisions of
PITA for evicting her from the premises.
The Court held that the
unfettered discretion conferred on the magistrate to remove any woman
believed to be a prostitute from his jurisdiction by section 20 violated
Article 14. The Court held that prostitute women were subject to a
punitive form of surveillance to which other women were not, and that
this differential treatment constituted discrimination between persons who
were similarly situated. 125
In The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kaushailiya,126 section 20 was again
challenged as violating Article 14. The Supreme Court, in adopting the
reasonable classification approach, held that the difference between
prostitute
women and non-prostitute
women was a reasonable
classification. Further, the Court ruled that there were real differences
between a prostitute woman who does not demand in the public's interest
any restrictions on her movements, and a prostitute, whose actions in

124

125

126

children in distress. The Court cited a Supreme Court decision, Ramesh Chander
v. Veena Kaushal, where it stated that "the brooding presence of the constitutional
empathy for the weaker sections like women and children must inform interpretation
if it has to have social relevance."
The Court relied on social justice as an
interpretive tool for constitutional provisions. The case does not elaborate beyond
stating that "men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to
livelihood" and that Article 15 (3) enables the State to make special provisions for
women and children.
A 1959 All. 57.
The decision was progressive in many important respects. Most significantly, the
Court was prepared to consider the work of prostitute women as a trade rather than
a crime. It recognized that women entered the profession because of social and
economic hardship, rather than immorality.
A 1964 S.C, 416; The High CoUrt had held that the delegation of power was
unguided and unfettered; and that women who were similarly situated - that is prostitute women, were being treated differently. It thus struck down the provision.
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public places call for the imposition of restrictions on her movements
and even deportation. The object of PITA was not only to suppress
immoral traffic in women and girls, but also to improve public morals by
removing prostitutes from busy public places in the vicinity of religious
and educational institutions. 127
The decision in Kaushilya is based on a formal model of equality.
The differences between prostitute and non-prostitute women, and the
differences between prostitutes in busy localities and prostitutes working
discretely, were seen to justify the differential treatment. The effect was
to preclude an entitlement to equality for those women who fell into the
"problematic" classification: prostitute women working in busy area.
There was no interrogation of the basis for the ostensible differences.
Rather, prostitute women were simply deemed different from other women
because of their inherent immorality. The approach not only stigmatises
prostitute women by justifying the criminalisation of their work, but also
uses moral considerations to distinguish them from all other women.
Prostitute women thus become inherently bad and immoral, and need to
be controlled by harsh penal provisions.
Several constitutional challenges to PITA have been made by brothel
owners. The Courts have rejected these challenges, holding that brothel
owners should not be allowed to take advantage of the ACt.128 These
cases also adopted a formal approach to equality, and a difference approach
to prostitute women. In Sayed Abdul Khair129, the Court held that the
provisions of PITA were a reasonable classification since young women
all over the world were special victims of the vice market.
In
Moainuddinl30,
the Court held that women and girls who solicit for
prostitution were different from other women. While Sayed Abdul Khair
was based on the need to protect women, in Moainuddin, the Court
seemed more concerned with issues of morality. The differentiation is
based on assumptions that these women are essentially bad. This

127
128

129
130

Begum v. State, A 1963 Born. 17 (relied on).
In Sayed Abdul Khair v. Babubhai, Iamalbhai and Another 1974 Cr.LJ. 1337
(Born.). the accused, a brothel keeper, challenged section 15 (4) and 16 (1) of the
Act as violating Article 14, on the basis that the sections discriminated between
girls and women. The provisions empower a special police officer to enter any
premises to remove any girl under the age of 21 years if she is carrying on or being
made to carry on or attempts are being made to make her carry on any prostitution.
In Moainuddin v. State of 1986 Cr.L.l. 1397 (A.P.) Section 8 of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act, that punishes women or girls soliciting for the purposes of
prostitution, was challenged by a brothel keeper as violating Article 14.
Id. Sayed Abdul Khair at 1349 para 14.
Id. at 1398 para 4.

National Law School Journal

46

[1993

differentiation disqualifies them from equality and perpetuates their
situation and status as 'bad women'.
(iv)

Bail

Several challengeshave been directedto section497(1) of the Criminal
Procedure Code which allows the Court to grant bail in non-bailable
cases when: the accused is under 16 years of age; a woman; sick; or
infirm. In Nirmal Kumar Banerjee v. The State131 the Calcutta High
Court held that the constitutional validity of the provision had to be
determined against Article 14, a general provision, read together with
Article 15(3), a provision where the State was empowered to allow
special treatment for women and children. The provision was held to
constitute a reasonable classification, as a female, or a person below 16
years of age, or an infirm person, were not likely to interfere with the
investigation or to delay the trial by abscondence or interference.
While the Court adopts a "holistic approach" to the equality
provisions, it continues to interpret discrimination in a way that means
any distinction,rather than distinctionsthat disadvantagewithin the broader
meaning of equality. In so doing, the Court's understanding can be seen
to be firmly located within a formal model of equality. It upholds the
provision by adopting a protectionist position whereby women are to be
treated in the same way as a person under 16 or someone with an
infirmity. Women are seen as weak, as incapable of exercising basic
rights in the same way as children and the infirm, and thereby in need of
protection.
Similarly, in Mt. Choki v. State of Rajasthan132, the Court held that
section 497(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, in providing for special
provisions in favour of women and children, was within the scope of
Article 15(3). The decision was based on the reasoning that, for the
purposes of bail, women and children are different from men. The
assumption informing the decision is that women are caretakers of the
home and thus need to be accommodated so that the home does not
suffer. The reasoning is thus based on an protectionist understanding of
gender and of women's roles in the home. There is no inquiry into the
institutional and structural discriminationsthat are responsible for keeping
women in the home and in the role of primary care givers.

131
132

1972 Cr. LJ. 1582 (Cal.).
A 1975 Raj. 10.
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Education

The case law in this area has involved challenges to the admission
practices of educational institutions. In one set of cases, female students
have been denied or restricted access to particular schools and colleges.
This restricted access has been challenged as discrimination on the basis
of sex, and thus, in violation of Article 15. The Courts have generally
upheld the restrictions. The grounds have been varied, but the approaches
have predominantly been narrow and technical, focusing for example on
the meaning of discrimination and/or the significance of "only on the
basis of sex". The Courts have generally been unwilling to find such
admission practices to be discrimination on the basis of sex. In considering
, these restrictions under Article 15(3), the courts have emphasized the
objective of the practices, namely, the attempt to promote schools and
colleges specifically for women. The admission practices are thereby
seen as preferential treatment as authorized by Article 15(3). While the
result could be supported by a substantive model of equality, the discourse
of the decisions remain informed by a model of formal equality.
In Anjali Roy v. State of W.B.133an order of the Director of Public
Institution directing that no more women students be admitted to College
A, but only to College B was challenged as violating Article 15. The
High Court held that there was no discrimination within the meaning of
Article 15(1) and upheld the restricted access. The Court adopted the
technical approach of "only on the ground of sex", and concluded that no
"discrimination was made against the appellant only on the ground that
she was a woman".l34 The refusal to admit the appellant was, according
to the Court, not only on the ground of sex but "due to the introduction
of a comprehensive schel)1e for the provision of education facilities to
both male and female students".135
The cardinal fact is that she was not refused admission merely
because she was a woman, but because under a scheme of better
organization of both male and female students at Hooghly, which
covered development of the Women's College as a step towards
the advancement of female education ... 136
The holding is consistent with a corrective approach to gender difference

133
134

135
136

Supra note 19.
Id. at 830 para 17.
Id.
Id.
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and a substantive model of equality - that is -.women's difference must
be recognized to overcome historic disadvantage. Yet the decision of the
Court was firmly located within a formal model of equality. While
recognising that discrimination involves invidious distinctions, the Court
adopted the formal equality approach to the relationship between Articles
15(1) and 15(3), and as such, could hold that special provisions for
women were legitimate, although they allowed invidious discrimination
against men. 137 The Court did not consider invidious discrimination
within the broader context of substantive inequalities, but only within a
formal equality context, such that invidious discrimination can be directed
equally at men as at women. The only difference is that Article 15(3)
permits the former, and not the latter.
The Court subsequently noted the exclusion of sex from Article
29(2) which deals specifically with admission to educational institutions:l38
The framers of the constitution may have thought that because of
the physical and mental differences between men and women
and considerations incidental thereto, exclusion of men from
certain institutions serving women only, and vice versa would
not be hostile or unreasonable discrimination.139
This passing reference to "physical and mental differences between men
and women" is significant. While the Court does not specifically endorse
this explicit statement of natural and essential gender differences, the
failure to interrogate the assumptions suggests that it is not seen as
controversial - and in fact, reinforces this view of essential differences. 140
In University of Madras v. Shanta Bai,141 an order directing that
women students not be admitted to affiliated colleges without receiving
special permission was challenged as violating Article 15. The Court
held that the university was not part of the State within the meaning of
Article 12, and is therefore not subject to the prohibitions of Article

137

131

139
1<40

141

Id. at 831 para 20.
Article 29 of the Constitution provides:(1) Any section of the citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof
having a distinct language·, script or culture of its own shall have the right to
conserve the same.
(2) No citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained
by the State of receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race,
caste language or any of them.
Supra note 19 at 831 para 22.
Id. But the Court declined to rule on the relationship between Articles 29(2) and 15.
A 1954 Mad. 67.
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15.142 However, the Court then considered the relationship between
Article 15 and Article 29(2) of the Constitution,143 and held:
...The true scope of Article 15(3) is that notwithstanding Article
15(1), it will be lawful for the State to establish educational
institutions solely for women and that the exclusion of men
students from such institutions would not contravene Article 15(1).
The combined effect of both Articles 15(3) and 29(2) is that
while men students have no right of admission to women's
colleges, the right of women to admission in other colleges is a
matter within the regulation of the authorities of these colleges. 144
The Court further discussed the reasons underlying these admission
policies, namely, the insufficient number of women's colleges to
accommodate the demand.
In a later set of cases, the allotment of seats for female students
within educational institutions has been the subject of constitutional
challenges. In Balaji v. State of Mysore,145 for example, the Supreme
Court held that Article 15(4) could not be interpreted so as to render
15(1) nugatory, and therefore, that reservations could not exceed 50%.
An issue that has subsequently arisen is whether the allotment of seats
for women constitutes a reservation within the meaning of 15(4), and
thus, whether the allotment of these seats are to be considered in
calculating the permissible 50%. The judicial approach to the issue has
been divided. Sometimes this allotment of seats for women has been
held to be a reservation.l46 Other times the allotment has been designated

142

143

Educational institutions will fall within the scope of Article 15 only if they are state
maintained;
the University of Madras is state-aided, but not state maintained.
Supra note 141 at 70 para 9 [••...the omission of "sex" in Article 29(2) would appear
to be a deliberate departure from the language of Article 15(1) and its object must
have been to leave it to the educational authorities to make their own rules suited to
the conditions and not to force on them an obligation to admit women"].

144

Id.

143

A 1963 S.C. 649.
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In Subhash Chandra v. State, A 1973 All. 295 the Court held that the allotment of
seats for women in medical school was a reservation, and thus, to be taken into
account in calculating the total reservation of seats. The Court held: ["Sub-articles
(3) and (4) of Article 15 classify women and children, socially ...as distinct groups.
If the State Government makes reservations for these groups it cannot be said that
classification is not based on rational differentia. The objective of these reservations
in favour of various categories of candidates is obviously to make special provision
for their advancement"]
The Court thus concluded that such reservations were
within the scope of Article 15(3), and did not offend Article 15(1).
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as an "indication of source", and not a reservation.147

F. Family Law
Constitutional challenges to family laws on the ground of sex
discrimination have met with very mixed results.l48 In some cases, the
Courts have held that laws which treat women differently than men are
discriminatory and thus, in violation of the equality guarantees. Indeed,
some cases recognise that the discriminatory treatment is based on sexist
attitudes and practices which reinforce women's subordination.
The
approach adopted by those courts is one of formal equality and sameness
- women and men are the same, and thus ought to be treated the same in
law. However, other cases have rejected the challenges to family laws.
These cases, though also adopting a formal model of equality, emphasise
the differences between women and men, and thus, preclude interrogation
of substantive inequalities.
(i)

Divorce

Section 10 of the Divorce Act (1869) which provides that a husband
may petition for divorce on the basis of his wife's adultery alone, but
that a wife may only petition for divorce on the basis of her husband's
147

148

In Sukhvinder Kaur v. State, A 1974 H.P. 35 the High Court refused to treat the
allotment of seats for women, as well as those allotted for other diverse categories
which did not come within the definition of backward classes as "reservation".
In Padmaraj Samarendra v. State of Bihar and another, A 1979 Pat. 266, the Court
held that the allotment of seats for female students was not a reservation in the
strict sense. Reservations involve the allotment of seats "for the reason that the
persons for whom the seats are earmarked should be educationally, socially or
culturally backward and require protection". In this case, according to the Court,
the allotment of seats for women was not for this reason, but rather, based on the
state's need for more female doctors in government hospitals. Thus, the Court held
that the allotment was not a reservation, but an allotment of source. The Court
further held that since the reason for the allotment was the state need for female
doctors, the allotment was not "only on the grounds of sex", and thus, did not
violate Article 15 (1).
Challenges to social reform in personal law, on the basis of violating equality rights
under Art. 14 and 15 have generally been dismissed by the Courts. See, for
example, Gogireddy Sambireddy v. Gogireddy Jayarnma and another A 1972 A.P.
156. As Seervai notes, it has generally been held that ["...the State is entitled to
proceed by stages and to consider whether any particular community governed by
the personal law is ripe enough for reform to proceed"] SEERVAI, supra note 10, at
403. The focus of the subsequent discussion is thus on constitutional challenses
specifically dealing with allegations of sex discrimination within particular personal
laws, not as between different personal laws.
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adultery coupled with desertion, cruelty, rape, incest or bigamy, has been
challenged as violating Articles 14 and 15. In an early case, Dwaraka
Bai v. Professor N. Mathews,I49 the Court held that section 10 was based
on differences in adultery committed by women and men, and thus
constituted a sensible classification.
A husband commits an adultery somewhere but he does not bear
a child as a result of such adultery, and make it the legitimate
child of his wife's to be maintained by the wife. He cannot bear
a child nor is his wife bound to maintain the child. But if the
wife commits adultery, she may bear a child as a result of such
adultery and the husband will have to treat it as his legitimate
child and will be liable to maintain that child under s. 488 ... 150
According to the Court, these differences justified the different grounds
for divorce, and Section 10 was upheld.
More recently, in Swapna Ghosh v. Sadananda Ghosh,lSl section 10
was again challenged. After reviewing the justification for this provision
-namely - that a husband would not bear a child to be maintained by his
wife, but a wife might bear a child to be maintained by her husband,I52
the Court held:
I would like to think that even assuming that the liability to
conceive as a result of adulterous inter-course may otherwise be
a reasonable ground for classification between a husband and a
wife permissible under Article 14, since a wife conceives and the
husband does not only because of the peculiarities of their
respective sex, any discrimination on such ground would be a
discrimination on the ground of sex alone against the mandatory
prohibition of Article l5.lS3
The Court, however, concluded that the case could be decided without a

149

A 1953 Mad. 792.

Id, at 800 para 30.
m A 1989 Cal. 1.
In The Court noted that the only defense for this provision was that stated in Dwarka
Bai v. Mathews, supra note 149, at para 3, namely, where the Court held that since
the husband even by committing adultery "does not bear a child as a result and
make it a child of his wife to be maintained by the wife", the wife by committing
adultery "may bear a child as a result of such adultery and the husband will have to
treat it as his legitimate child and will be liable to maintain that child under Section
488, Criminal Procedure Code ...",
1'3 Supra note 151, at 3 para 3.
150
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determination of these issues:
My only endeavour is to draw the attention of our concerned
legislature to these anachronistic incongruities and the provisions
of Article 15 of the Constitution forbidding all discrimination on
the ground of Religion or Sex and also to Article 44 staring at
our face for four decades with its solemn directive to frame a
UCC.l54

On the facts, the Court confirmed the divorce decree in favour of the
wife on the grounds of the husband's adultery, cruelty and desertion.lSS
While the decisions reached in these two challenges to s. 10 of the
Divorce Act were different, the reasoning informing the decisions is
similar in many important respects. Firstly, both decisions are located
within a formal model of equality. In Dwaraka Bai, women and men
were seen as different, and therefore as not qualifying for equal treatment.
In Ghosh, the Court similarly accepted that the differences between women
and men might be the basis for a reasonable classification for the purposes
of Article 14. However, the decision in Ghosh turned on the Court's
approach to Article 15. The Court adopted the 'only on the ground of
sex' approach to Article 15(1), and that any differential treatment on the
basis of the reproductive differences between women and men would
constitute discrimination 'only on the ground of sex'. In the Court's
view, sex was an absolutely prohibited ground for classification, and
thus, section 10 of the Divorce Act which did not treat women and men
the same, was in violation of Article 15(1). Further, the two decisions
adopt very similar approaches to gender difference. In Dwaraka Bai, the
differences between women and men justified the different grounds for
divorce. In Ghosh, the differences between women and men did not
justify the different grounds for divorce.
Notwithstanding
these
differences, women and men had to be treated the same. Yet, both
decisions focus on the same biological differences of reproduction. Both
decisions view these differences as natural and as the only possible
justification for the differential treatment. Both decisions collapse the
biological differences of reproduction with the gender differences that
have been socially constructed - differences that have also come to be

154 Id. at 3 para 4.
mId. at 5 para 9. More specifically,

the divorce decree was confirmed "on the ground

that the husband-respondent is guilty of adultery coupled with such cruelty as
without adultery would have justified a decree of judicial separation and also of
adultery coupled with desertion without reasonable excuse for two years and more".
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viewed as natural and inevitable. The decisions are informed by the same
understanding of difference -the oQly distinction between them being the
legal significance of this difference. The two decisions, although different
in their result, can be seen as located within the same discourse of formal
equality and a very similar discourse of gender difference.
(ii)

Restitution of Conjugal Rights

Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which provides for the remedy
of restitution of conjugal rights, has repeatedly been challenged as
violating Article 14.156 In Sareetha v. Venkata SubbaiahlS7, the Court
held that section 9 did not meet the traditional classification test, and
was thus unconstitutional. The Court noted that Section 9 did not
discriminate between husband and wife on its face, in so far as "the
remedy of restitution of conjugal rights" is "equally available to both
wife and husband", and it thus "apparently satisfies the equality test".158
Notwithstanding this formal equality, the Court then turned its attention
to the operation of the remedy.
In our social reality, this matrimonial remedy is found used
almost exclusively by the husband and is rarely resorted to by
the wife .... The reason for this mainly lies in the fact of the
differences between the men and the women. By enforcing a
decree for restitution of conjugal rights the life pattern of the
wife is likely to be altered irretrievably whereas the husband's
can remain almost as it was before. This is so because it is the
wife who has to beget and bear a child. This is practical, but the
inevitable consequence of the enforcement of this remedy cripples
the wife's future plans of life and prevents her from using this
self destructive remedy. Thus the use of the remedy of restitution
of conjugal rights in reality becomes partial and one-sided and
available only to the husband .... 159
The Court thus held:

\56

\57
\58

\'9

See also Swaraj Garg v. K.M. Garg, A 1978 Del. 296, in considering the interpretation
of s. 9, wherein the Court held that any law that gave husbands the exclusive right
to decide the place of the matrimonial home without considering the merits of the
wife's claim would violate Article 14.
A 1983 A.P. 356.
Id. at 373 para 38.
Id.
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As a result, this remedy works in practice only as an engine of
oppression to be operated by the husband for the benefit of the
husband against the wife. By treating the wife and husband who
are inherently unequal as equals, section 9 of the Act offends the
rule of equal protection of the law. For that reason the formal
equality that Section 9 of the Act ensures cannot be accepted as
constitutional. 160
The Court in Sareetha concluded that notwithstanding the gender neutrality
of the provisions regarding the restitution of conjugal rights, the law had
a disparate impact on women. The law is used primarily by husbands
against their wives; not by wives against their husbands. Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the law operated "as an engine of oppression"
against women. The Court thus moved beyond a formal equality approach
to consider the substantive inequalities which are produced by the
operation of the law.
The approach in Sareetha, however, is not entirely unproblematic.
Firstly, while the Court seems on the one hand to expressly reject formal
equality as inadequate, the language of the decision on the other hand
retains this understanding of equality. For example, the Court specifically
concludes that women and men are unequals, and therefore ought not be
treated the same. The conclusion is cast in the language of formal
equality rather than moving beyond it. Moreover, the decision is
problematic in its approach to difference.
In the Court's view, the
inequalities produced by the law are a result of the differences between
women and men. The Court focuses on the biological differences of
reproduction, and, presents the differences between women and men as
natural and inevitable. Yet, there is much more at stake than biological
differences. The oppression to which the Court refers is not merely the
product of biological difference. It is a product of the sexual division of
labour in general, and the social relations of child rearing in particular,
which have been constructed around these biological differences, whereby
women have been allocated the responsibility for child care.
While women's role in child rearing is often seen as a natural
consequence of women's role in child bearing and thus, as biologically
determined, biological differences are relevant only in terms of pregnancy
and breast feeding. Beyond these early periods of infancy, women's
responsibility for child care is a social, not a natural phenomenon.
However, in Sareetha, these differences are collapsed, and women's role
in child care is seen as a natural product of biological difference.
160

Id.
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The approach of the Court to equality is commendable, in so far as it
recognises the impact of child rearing on women. However, the approach
to difference is somewhat problematic in so far as it reduces this difference
to a natural one. The decision exemplifies some of the dilemmas presented
by difference. If difference exists, and matters in the lives of individuals,
then it must be recognised.
Yet, in recognising difference, we risk
reinforcing the underlying social inequalities that produce these differences.
In the context of Sareetha, the dilemma is how to recognise the impact of
child rearing on women, without reinforcing the social inequalities that
have produced this sexual division of labour.
In Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh Choudhry, 161 section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act was again challenged. However, in this case, the
Delhi High Court rejected the challenge and declined to follow the case
of Sareetha. The Court noted that while Sareetha was based on the
assertion that "a suit for restitution by the wife .is rare", this was only
true prior to the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act. Since the Hindu
Marriage Act was amended in 1964 allowing either party of the marriage
to petition under section 13,
There is complete equality of the sexes here and equal protection
of the laws. 162
The Court was only concerned with formal equality - that is, with whether
women and men were treated as formal equals under the law. There is
no consideration of the impact of the law, nor in turn, whether there is a
disparate impact of the law on women.
In rejecting the challenge, the Court further held that the Constitution
ought not to be applied to the family.
Introduction

of Constitutional

Law in the home is most

~inappropriate. It is like introducing a bull in a china shop. It
will prove to be a ruthless destroyer of the marriage institution
and all that it stands for. In the privacy of the home and the
married life, neither Article 21 nor Article 14 have any place. In
a sensitive sphere which is at once most intimate and delicate,
the introduction of the cold principles of Constitutional Law will
have the effect of weakening the marriage bond. 163
161
162

163

A 1984 Del. 66.
Id. at 75 para 44.
The Court further articulated its understanding of the fljffiily as private, and thus
beyond the scope of the Constitution: ["In the home the consideration that really
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In the Court's view, the application of constitutional law would encourage
litigation within the marital relationship - litigation which should be
discouraged as far as possible.
The reasoning in Harvinder Kaur is a classic statement of the
understanding of the family as private and of the public/private distinction.
The family is understood as private, and thus beyond the appropriate
intervention of the law. This public/private distinction has been an
important
dimension
of the legal reinforcement
of women's
subordination.l64 Women have traditionally been confined to the private
sphere of the family, as wives and mothers, sisters and daughters; and
their access to the public sphere has been denied. The public/private
distinction has been used to insulate from legal review the discrimination
that women face within the private sphere of the family. Discriminatory
practices, ranging from unequal inheritance rights, to sexual assault, to
dowry death have been, and continue to be justified on the ground that
they occur within the private sanctuary of the family, and thus beyond
the scope of the law.
The constitutionality of section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was
obtains is the natural love and affect which counts for so little in these cold
Courts"]. Id. at para 45. In support of its view, the Court cited the 1919 English
case of Balfour v. Balfour 2 KB 571 which in its view: [" ...illustrates that the house
of everyone is to him his castle and fortress. The spouses can claim a kind of
sacred protection behind the door of the family home which, generally speaking, the
civil authority may not penetrate. The introduction of Constitutional Law into the
ordinary domestic relationship of husband and wife will strike at the very root of
that relationship and will be a fruitful source of dissension and quarrelling"].
164 Madhu Kishwar, "Some Aspects of Bondage:
The Denial of Fundamental Rights to
Women", MANUS HI 31 (Jan.-Feb. 1983), arguing that the family structure in India
reinforces the subordination of women in a way that precludes women's access to
fundamental rights. At 31-32, she writes: ["The feature which most distinguishes
women's oppression is that the denial of their most basic rights takes place first and
foremost within the family.
This is done so effectively that the hand of the
government or of any similar repressive agency is seldom visible in keeping women
oppressed. That is why it is easy to dismiss such violations as private family affairs
rather than as social and political issues. But if we examine closely how the family
functions in keeping women subjected we can begin to see how an exploitative
family structure receives crucial support from the government and the state through
various laws and rules of behaviour which legitimate the authority of the male
members over the lives of women members of the family"]; See also NANDITA
HAKSAR, DEMYSTIFICA TION OF LAW FOR WOMEN 58 (1986); Nadine Taub
and Elizabeth Schneider, "Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of
Law" in THE POUTICS OF LAW (D. Kairyns ed. 1982); Frances Olsen, "The
.Myth of State Intervention" 18 MICH. L. REV 835 (1985); Judy Fudge, "The
PublicJPrivate Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to Further Feminist
Struggles" 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 485 (1987).
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considered by the Supreme Court in Saroj Rani v Sudarshan Kumar. 165
The Court held that restitution of conjugal rights did not violate Article
14, thus affirming the decision in Harvinder Kaur and overruling the
decision in Sareetha. According to the Court:
In India it must be borne in mind that conjugal rights ie the right
of the husband or the wife to the society of the other spouse is
not merely a creature of the statute. Such a right is inherent in
the very institution of marriage itself. 166
In the Court's view, there were sufficient procedural safeguards to prevent
section 9 "from being a tyranny", and that the decree was only intended
where the disobedience was willful. The Court further held that the
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights "serves a social purpose as an
aid to the prevention of the break-up of marriage", and thus concluded
without any further equality analysis that it did not violate Article 14.
While the Court implicitly adopts the approach to equality and gender of
the Delhi High Court in Harvinder Kaur, it does not expressly state or
develop its own views in this regard. 167
(iii)

Succession Laws

Several challenges have been made to the laws of succession. These
challenges have overwhelmingly
unsuccessful.
In Mukta Bai v.
Kamalaksha 168 hindu personal law which excluded illegitimate daughters
from maintenance from the estate of their putative fathers was challenged
as violating Article 14. In rejecting the challenge, the Court held:
The fact that the law makes no provision for the maintenance of
16S
166

167

168

A 1984 S.C. 1562.
Id. at 1562 para 15.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court did not comment on the holding in
Harvinder Kaur regarding the non-applicability of the Constitution to the legal
regulation of the family. Further, more recent cases involving challenges to personal
laws have not strictly followed Harvinder Kaur in so far as the non-applicability of
the Constitution to the legal regulation of the family is concerned. For example, in
Krishna Murthy v. P.S. Uma, A 1987 A.P. 237. Swapna Gosh v. Sadanada Gosh
supra note 151; and Lalitha Ubhayamkar and another v. Union of India and another,
A 1991 Kar. 186; the courts were willing to consider constitutional challenges to
the Hindu Marriage Act, The Divorce Act (1869), and the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, respectively. The ideology of privacy was not invoked, as in
Harvinder Kaur, to preclude an analysis of the operation of the provisions of
relating to the legal regulation of the family.
A 1960 Mys. 182.
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an illegitimate daughter cannot be said to amount to
discrimination against illegitimate daughters, such as would
amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.169
The reasoning in the decision is entirely conclusory. There is no
consideration of Article 14 case law, nor any analysis of why the
distinction did not amount to discrimination.
Challenges to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, on the ground that it
discriminated on the basis of sex, brought overwhelming by men have
been rejected by the courts. For example, in Kaur Singh v. Jaggar
Singh170Section 14, which provides a female Hindu with the right of
absolute ownership over her property was challenged as discriminatory.17l
While the Court acknowledged that the Hindu Succession Act did create
an apparent anomaly in the powers of alienation of property, it held that
the removal of such remained the prerogative of the legislature, not the
courts. The Court held that "it may well be that in view of the inferior
status enjoyed by the females, the Legislature thought fit to put the
females on a higher pedestal", which was within the purview of Article
15(3).172It further held that women as a class were different from men as
a class and the legislature had merely removed the disability attaching to
women.
In Partap Singh v. Union of India173, section 14(1) was again
challenged as violating Articles 14 and 15(1). The Court found that
section 14(1) was enacted to address the problem faced by hindu women
who were unable to claim absolute interest in properties inherited from
their husbands, but rather, who could only enjoy these properties with
the restrictions attached to widow's estates under hindu law. As a
special provision intended to benefit and protect women who have
traditionally been discriminated against in terms of access to property, it
was not open to hindu males to challenge the provision as hostile
discrimination. Rather, the Court concluded that the provision was
protected by Article 15(3), which in its view, "overrides clause 15(1)".174

169
170
171

172

173
174

Id. at 183 para 5.
A 1961 Punj. 489.
The plaintiffs argued that the effect of section 14 was discrimination in the powers
of alienation of property between women and men. While women had by virtue of
section 14 absolute ownership and thus absolute rights of alienation, men who were
still governed by the Punjab Customary Law were not free to dispose of ancestral
immoveable property by will.
Id. at 493 para 13.
A 1985 S.C. 1695.
Id. at 1697 para 6.
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While the Court thus upheld the provision, the approach to equality and
to gender on which it did so remains unclear. The decision could be
informed by either a protective approach (women need special provisions
to protect them) or a corrective approach (women have historically been
discriminated against and require special provisions to correct). The
Court's reference to the traditional problems that women faced in property
ownership is suggestive of the latter.
In Sonubhai Yeshwant Jabhar v. Bala Govinda Yadav and Others17S
section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession
Act was challenged
as
discriminating on the basis of sex, and thus being in violation of Articles
14 and 15. Section 15(2) (b) provides that the property inherited from a
husband of a female Hindu dying intestate will devolve upon the heirs of
the husband, whereas s. 8, dealing with the property of a male Hindu
dying intestate does not make any such provision regarding .property
inherited from his wife. In rejecting the challenge, the Court held that
the rules were enacted with the clear intention of ensuring the continuity
of the property within the husband's line. The assumption that property
should be passed down through the male line is so deeply held that the
Court does not question the gender bias of the assumption. The historic
discrimination against women in inheritance has created a norm -that
property passed through the male line - and it is against this norm which
any challenges to the practice are measured, and ultimately rejected.
(iv)

Maintenance

Constitutional challenges have been directed to the maintenance
provisions of several family law statutes. In Puranananda Banerjee v.
Sm. Swapan Banerjee and Anotherl76, section 36 of the Special Marriage
Act, which provides for a grant of alimony pendente lite to a wife was
challenged as violating Article 15. In upholding the section, the Court
held that it did not discriminate only on the basis of sex, but rather
provided maintenance where the wife had no independent income
sufficient for her support. The Court further held that even if section 36
did discriminate on the basis of sex alone, it would be protected by
Article 15(3).
The Court has approached the question of the constitutionality of
section 36 from the perspective of formal equality. In its effort to
uQhold the provision, the Court first adopted the technical approach of

,

175
176

A 1983 Born. 156.
A 1981 Cal. 123.
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"only on the ground of sex". Rather then viewing women's economic
dependency as a socially constructed gender difference, the Court severed
sex from what sex socially implies. The formal model of equality is
echoed in the Court's understanding of discrimination - that is - as any
distinction on the prohibited grounds - which is justified under Article
15(3).
The objective of the Court in this case is laudable - that is - it sought
to uphold legislation specifically designed to address women's economic
dependency in the family. However, this objective could be better served
by a substantive approach to equality, which directs attention to whether
the rule in question contributes to the disadvantage of women, and a
corrective approach to gender, which acknowledges that women may
need to be treated differently to make up for past disadvantage. Within
such an approach, the provision could be upheld on the ground that it
takes gender difference into account to compensate for past disadvantage.
The reality of women's economic dependence, resulting from the sexual
division of labour within the family, requires that provisions exIst to
recognize and compensate women for this dependence. 177
VI

Conclusion

In this paper, we have attempted to provide a compreherl"::v" review
of the High Court and Supreme Court constitutional cases on sex
discrimination. We have argued that this case law is primarily informed
by a formal model of equality - that is - an understanding of equality as
sameness, and a disqualification of those who are different from an
entitlement to equality. We have tried to reveal the ways in which this
understanding of equality has lead to a focus on the relevance of gender
difference.
In one set of cases, the courts have held that women are different
than men; that women are weaker and in need of protection.
This
difference is used to virtually disentitle women to any claim to equality.
In upholding legislation, this approach cannot distinguish between
differential treatment that disadvantages and differential treatment that
advantages. It cannot, in other words, distinguish between legislation
that further contributes to women's subordination, and legislation that
In

In Krishna Murthy v. P.S. Umadeui, A 1987 A.P. 237, section 24 of the Hindu Marriage
Act was challenged as violating Article 14, on the basis that a spouse's liability for
alimony was vague, particularly as compared to the Divorce Act, where a husband's
liability for alimony w~ ell.pI"essly-limited to a mall.imwn of 1/5 of his income, In a brief
decision, the High Court rejected the challenge, and held that there was no invidious
discrimination or undue disability to the wife or the husband.
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attempts to correct or compensate for that subordination. Rather, any
and all differential treatment can be justified on the basis that women are
essentially and biologically different.
In the second set of cases, the courts have held that for the purposes
of legislation, women and men are the same, and therefore must be
treated the same in law. The sameness approach has been used to uphold
legislation that treats women and men the same, and to strike down
legislation ~at treats women differently. However, in striking down the
legislation, this approach cannot distinguish as between differential
treatment that disadvantages and differential treatment that advantages.
Like the protectionist approach, there is no distinction between
protectionist legislation that discriminates against women, and corrective
legislation that attempts to compensate for past discrimination. In
comparison to the protectionist approach, the sameness approach would
strike down both protectionist and corrective legislation.
In contrast to formal equality, we have described a second substantive
model of equality, and have attempted to reveal the limited extent to
which this alternative vision of equality has informed judicial
intetpretations. In this model, equality is not a question of sameness and
difference, but rather a question of disadvantage. Within a substantive
model of equality the central question is whether the impugned legislation
contributes to the subordination of the disadvantaged group, or to
overcoming that subordination. This model of equality creates space for
a third approach to gender difference, that is a corrective approach. This
third, though very small set of cases recognises that to correct or
compensate for past discrimination, women may have to be treated
differently.
By asking different questions, then, the substantive approach to
equality can direct attention to, and distinguish between protective and
corrective legislation, that is, rules that contribute to women's
subordination, and rules that contribute to overcoming that subordination.
This model can be used to strike down protective legislation, and to
uphold corrective legislation. Moreover, this model of equality still
leaves room for a sameness approach - that is - by focusing on the
relative advantage and disadvantages of women - the inquiry can lead to
the conclusion that in a particular context, gender difference ought to be
irrelevant, and women and men ought to be treated the same.

